his paper examines, in the context of a multiple types of consumers, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions under which equilibrium and optimum exist, and involve mixing types of consumers in jurisdictions. Pricing includes visa permits for entry. Following Berglas (1976), we assume anonymous crowding and complementarities in production. For a large economy, we prove existence of equilibrium and the first and second welfare theorems. Our simultaneous optimization approach provides a new technique for showing existence of equilibrium in local public good economies with local production and a continuum of agents.Financial support of FCT and INOVA (Portugal), the European Science Foundation (through the activity “Public Goods, P...
This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy, where a jurisdiction's choi...
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant game-theoretic model of an economy with one p...
The present paper was prompted by the surprising discovery that the common strategy, adopted in a la...
his paper examines, in the context of a multiple types of consumers, a set of necessary and suffici...
thank the comments of the audience, and especially Nizar Allouch, Piero Gottardi, Emma Moreno and My...
We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy in which agents have two distinguishing...
We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy in which agents have two distinguishing...
We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how t...
We consider a new model of a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding in which we mak...
We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions wi...
We consider a Tiebout economy with differential crowding and public projects in which agents are dis...
We consider a Tiebout economy with differential crowding and public projects in which agents are dis...
1 Abstract: We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy in which agents have two di...
We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how t...
In the first essay we study the consequences of concern for relative position and status in a public...
This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy, where a jurisdiction's choi...
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant game-theoretic model of an economy with one p...
The present paper was prompted by the surprising discovery that the common strategy, adopted in a la...
his paper examines, in the context of a multiple types of consumers, a set of necessary and suffici...
thank the comments of the audience, and especially Nizar Allouch, Piero Gottardi, Emma Moreno and My...
We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy in which agents have two distinguishing...
We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy in which agents have two distinguishing...
We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how t...
We consider a new model of a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding in which we mak...
We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions wi...
We consider a Tiebout economy with differential crowding and public projects in which agents are dis...
We consider a Tiebout economy with differential crowding and public projects in which agents are dis...
1 Abstract: We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy in which agents have two di...
We revisit the Tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how t...
In the first essay we study the consequences of concern for relative position and status in a public...
This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy, where a jurisdiction's choi...
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant game-theoretic model of an economy with one p...
The present paper was prompted by the surprising discovery that the common strategy, adopted in a la...