Add to ORKGWe show that if there are Constant Returns to Scale in the production of the public good a) Any Lindahl equilibrium (L.E) is a Hash equilib:-iurn (N.E.) in a price-setting game, b) not all N.E. ~-e L.E., but just those fo:- which the production of the public good is positive and c) the set of L.E. and Strong Equilibria coincide. However if the supply function is continuously differentiable, L.E. is never a N.E. We end the paper with sorne general comments about the nature of the incentive problem
This paper introduces a new incentive compatible mechanism which for general preference environments...
Abstract. In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining pro-cedure whose equilibr...
In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure, the equilibria of which ...
We show that if there are Constant Returns to Scale in the production of the public good a) Any Lind...
The play of a game is a public good because it is "consumed" by each of the players. We model the pl...
Lindahl equilibrium is an application of price-taking behavior to achieve efficiency in the allocati...
The motivation for the Lindahl equilibrium is mostly a rather artificial price mechanism. Even thoug...
Lindahl equilibria are often seen as an ideal outcome of cooperation in a public-goods economy. But ...
In an economy without public goods, competitive equilibrium and Shapley value agree. We show that fo...
Lindahl equilibria are often seen as an ideal outcome of cooperation in a public-goods economy. But ...
We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a unique Lindahl equilibriu...
In an economy, there are essentially three approaches to the problem of value and distribution: pure...
This paper contains a proof of the existence of Lindahl equilibrium in a very general model of exter...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
International audienceIn this article, we establish the existence of Lindahl equilibria in an econom...
This paper introduces a new incentive compatible mechanism which for general preference environments...
Abstract. In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining pro-cedure whose equilibr...
In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure, the equilibria of which ...
We show that if there are Constant Returns to Scale in the production of the public good a) Any Lind...
The play of a game is a public good because it is "consumed" by each of the players. We model the pl...
Lindahl equilibrium is an application of price-taking behavior to achieve efficiency in the allocati...
The motivation for the Lindahl equilibrium is mostly a rather artificial price mechanism. Even thoug...
Lindahl equilibria are often seen as an ideal outcome of cooperation in a public-goods economy. But ...
In an economy without public goods, competitive equilibrium and Shapley value agree. We show that fo...
Lindahl equilibria are often seen as an ideal outcome of cooperation in a public-goods economy. But ...
We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a unique Lindahl equilibriu...
In an economy, there are essentially three approaches to the problem of value and distribution: pure...
This paper contains a proof of the existence of Lindahl equilibrium in a very general model of exter...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
International audienceIn this article, we establish the existence of Lindahl equilibria in an econom...
This paper introduces a new incentive compatible mechanism which for general preference environments...
Abstract. In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining pro-cedure whose equilibr...
In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure, the equilibria of which ...