Decisiveness and Inclusiveness : Two Aspects of the Intergovernmental Choice of European Voting Rules

When studying the constitutional choice of European voting rules, most power index analyses concentrate on member states' relative decisiveness for forming winning coalitions in the Council of Ministers. These studies have two shortcomings: (a) They ignore the distribution of relative power between the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, as defined by the multi-cameral European legislative procedures. (b) They disregard the absolute notion of power, which is dependent on the inclusion of member states in winning coalitions under various voting rules. In this article we present our approach on member states' constitutional choice of European voting rules with regard to the two notions of power: actors' relative decisiveness and their absolute inclusiveness in decision making. We present an index to measure inclusiveness and apply our concept to the European multi-cameral legislature. On the basis of our study, we present a reasoned account of motives behind member states' recent institutional reforms of legislative procedures