Four acceptations of liberty in the philosophy of Benedictus de Spinoza

The four acceptations of the term liberty in the opus of Spinoza, which the author examines, are called the ontological, the free will, the human power, and the political liberty. In the appendix of this thesis, the author quotes unabridged the most important passages concerning the problem of liberty. Attached is an excerpt of Spinoza´s Ethica, with all paragraphs listed according to keywords in a subject catalogue.In connection with the ontological liberty the author investigates the meaning of inner necessity, coercion and causal determinism, of chance and possibility, of essentia, conatus, existence and duration of the modi, and finally the liberty of God, the complete realisation of the ontological liberty.The free will is rejected by Spinoza both concerning God and men because of fundamental reasons. The author explains Spinoza´s variety of determinism within monistical parallelism and Spinoza´s presumption about the popularity of the illusion of the (own) free will.The main part of the thesis is devoted to the liberty of human power. The author gives an overview of Spinoza´s mechanics of affection in comparison to the neostoicistical approach of Justus Lipsius (1547-1606). Spinoza´s relativism of values, his theory of action, his ideal of life guided by reason, his understanding of happiness and virtue, his conception of the free men (homo liber) and of the joy of cognition (amor dei), and the importance of the mos geometricos of the Ethica for Spinoza´s conception of liberty are explained.Because Spinoza considers men first of all as social beings, his philosophy always contains a political and social statement even in its metaphysical guise. The political meaning of liberty, the liberty of belief and opinion, and the democratic rights, are briefly discussed as the fourth acceptation of liberty