Add to ORKGWe introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic that makes use only of packet timing information on the uplink. This attack is therefore impervious to existing packet padding defences. In addition, unlike existing approaches this timing-only attack does not require knowledge of the start/end of web fetches and so is effective against traffic streams. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack against both wired and wireless traffic, achieving mean success rates in excess of 90%. In addition to being of interest in its own right, this timing-only attack serves to highlight deficiencies in existing defences and so to areas where it would be beneficial for VPN designers to focus further attention
Abstract — This paper presents a nefarious low-cost traffic analysis attack in packet-based networks...
Web-based timing attacks have been known for over a decade, and it has been shown that, under optima...
Abstract—The performance of remote timing attacks is highly dependent on the network connection that...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic that makes use only of packet timing informati...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic that makes use only of packet timing informati...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic passing over the first hop – between client an...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic passing over the first hop – between client an...
Abstract—We consider a timing-only based attack against encrypted and padded web traffic. The attack...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic passing over the first hop – between client an...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic passing over the first hop – between client an...
Abstract—We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic passing over the first hop – between c...
To perform successful remote timing attacks, an adversary typically collects a series of network tim...
Web-based timing attacks have been known for over a decade, and it has been shown that, under optima...
A passive local eavesdropper can leverage Website Fingerprinting (WF) to deanonymize the web browsin...
Abstract—Information leakage via side channels has become a primary security threat to encrypted web...
Abstract — This paper presents a nefarious low-cost traffic analysis attack in packet-based networks...
Web-based timing attacks have been known for over a decade, and it has been shown that, under optima...
Abstract—The performance of remote timing attacks is highly dependent on the network connection that...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic that makes use only of packet timing informati...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic that makes use only of packet timing informati...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic passing over the first hop – between client an...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic passing over the first hop – between client an...
Abstract—We consider a timing-only based attack against encrypted and padded web traffic. The attack...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic passing over the first hop – between client an...
We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic passing over the first hop – between client an...
Abstract—We introduce an attack against encrypted web traffic passing over the first hop – between c...
To perform successful remote timing attacks, an adversary typically collects a series of network tim...
Web-based timing attacks have been known for over a decade, and it has been shown that, under optima...
A passive local eavesdropper can leverage Website Fingerprinting (WF) to deanonymize the web browsin...
Abstract—Information leakage via side channels has become a primary security threat to encrypted web...
Abstract — This paper presents a nefarious low-cost traffic analysis attack in packet-based networks...
Web-based timing attacks have been known for over a decade, and it has been shown that, under optima...
Abstract—The performance of remote timing attacks is highly dependent on the network connection that...