북한에 대한 금융제재들: 방코델타 아시아 제재의 실패원인 알아보기

학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 정치외교학부(외교학전공), 2013. 2. 윤영관.On September 15, 2005 the Treasury Department of the United States designated the small Macau-registered bank, Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a primary money laundering concern and warned US financial institutions to guard against their abuse by North Korea. As a consequence of this so-called reputational sanction, the Macau government seized $25million worth of DPRK (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea) assets while bank and institutions in over twenty countries took measures to deny financial services to the DRPK. Though the US claimed the sanction was related to international crime and not denuclearization, North Korea linked it to Six-Party Talks and blocked progress made on negotiations for an end to its nuclear program. The sanction was initially supported both domestically and abroad and can be seen to have been a success in seriously damaging the financial capabilities of the North Korean illicit profit-making network. However, it quickly became part of a broader strategy when it was adopted by Washington hardliners as part of a policy this paper terms hawk coercion that aimed to squeeze the DPRK financially while talking to them about denuclearization. This coercive diplomacy ultimately failed, and after missile launches and a nuclear test, the sanction was withdrawn. This paper will analyze the reasons why this reputational sanction, which devalues the market commodity of trust to great financial effect, failed as a coercive tool. Bruce Jentlesons coercive diplomacy framework will show that the policy, of which BDA sanction firstly was central, lacked proportionality, reciprocity and coercive coercion. Proportionality, as its initial objective was expanded from one of international crime to coercive denuclearization. Reciprocity, as ill timing and the ignoring of signaling meant that reciprocal trust was not attained. Coercive credibility, as a common interest and a reasonable objective was absent. In conclusion, the most fundamental reason that led to the failure of the BDA sanction will be identified. This has implications for the role of allied support and domestic political factions within coercer states in the imposition of reputational sanctions in coercive diplomacy.Ch I - Introduction: The BDA Affair ......................................................... 1-10 1.1 The BDA Events in Summary ............................................................. 1-4 1.2 Research Question ........................................................................... 5-7 1.3 Methodology .................................................................................... 7-9 1.4 Chapter Outline................................................................................ 9-10 Ch II - Research Framework: Coercive Diplomacy & BDA.......................... 11-28 2.1 Classification & Definition of Policy & Failure .................................... 11-25 2.1.1 Classification of BDA Action ........................................................... 11-12 2.1.2 BDA as a Reputational Sanction....................................................... 12-14 2.1.3 BDA Policy as Coercive ................................................................... 14-18 2.1.4 BDA as a Coercive Failure ............................................................... 18-20 2.2 BDA & Jentlesons Framework ............................................................ 21-25 2.3 Hypotheses ....................................................................................... 25-28 2.3.1 Hypothesis 1................................................................................... 26-27 2.3.2 Hypothesis 2 .................................................................................. 27 2.4.3 Hypothesis 3 .................................................................................. 28 Ch III - Literature Review: Economic Sanctions, Coercive Diplomacy & North Korea....................................................................................................... 29-36 3.1 Economic Sanctions .......................................................................... 29-31 3.2 Coercive Diplomacy .......................................................................... 32-33 3.3 Economic Sanctions on North Korea................................................... 33-35 3.4 Scholarly Contribution ....................................................................... 35-36 Ch IV - Descriptive Analysis: BDA Affairs Key Events................................ 37-70 4.1 Before Sept 2005: Pre-BDA Setting .................................................... 37-42 4.2 Stage 1: Sept 2005 - BDA Implementation ......................................... 43-47 4.3 Stage 2: 9.19 Agreement ................................................................... 47-50 4.4 Stage 3: Oct - Dec 2005 - North Korean Linkage ............................... 50-54 4.5 Stage 4: Jan - June 2006 - Hardened US Position ............................... 54-59 4.6 Stage 5: July - Sept 2006 - DPRK Missile Tests .................................. 59-62 4.7 Stage 6: Oct - Dec 2006 - DPRK Nuclear Test..................................... 62-64 4.8 Stage 7: Jan - June 2007 BDA Withdrawal ........................................... 64-70 Ch V - Framework Analysis: BDA failure in Coercive Terms........................ 71-94 5.1 ROK & PRC Support for US-DPRK Policy .............................................. 71-74 5.2 US/South Korea Relations & Coercive Credibility ................................. 74-81 5.2.1 Superior Strength ............................................................................ 75-76 5.2.2 Common Interest ............................................................................ 76-80 5.2.3 Reasonable Objective ...................................................................... 80-81 5.3 China & Coercive Credibility ............................................................... 81-86 5.3.1 Superior Strength ............................................................................ 82 5.3.2 Common Interest ............................................................................ 82-84 5.3.3 Reasonable Objective ...................................................................... 84-86 5.4 BDA Policy Goals ................................................................................ 86-87 5.5 US/DPRK Relations: Proportionality & Reciprocity ............................... 87-94 5.5.1Proportionality ................................................................................. 88-92 5.5.2 Reciprocity ...................................................................................... 92-94 Ch VI - Conclusion & Implications of the BDA Affair.................................. 95-101 6.1 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 95-97 6.2 Implications of the BDA Affair ............................................................. 98-101 Appendix................................................................................................... 102-111 BDASanction31CFRPart103 (20Sept2005)................................................... 102-107 Executive Order 13382 (21 Oct 2005) ....................................................... 108-109 BDA Advisory (13 Dec 2005) ...................................................................... 110-111 References.................................................................................................. 112-125 Korean Abstract ......................................................................................... 126Maste