On the problem of the definition of the term of art

This paper intended to show the main views against the possibility of the definition of art under discussion (1949-1958), and, then, to explain the counter argument by G. Dickie. However, as it seems necessary to add the required backgroud of such ways of thinking in aesthetics, brief historical contexts were described ahead. As is well known, the core notion around these discussions was 'family resemblances' which was raised by and in the post-Tractatus Wittgenstein. M.Weitz applied this notion to the analyses of traditional aesthetic theories, most of which have attempted to define the essential nature of art in general. This finally led him to say that 'art'was an open concept refusing to be defined even in classificatory sense. But G.Dickie opposed to him and suggested a possibility of defining art in terms of a certain social institution (the artworld) if we must not focus narrowly on the definition alone. Thus, he comes to the idea that 'art' can be closed by the necessary and sufficient conditions of artifactuality and conferred status, and that 'a work of art' is an object with the properties of artifactuality, whether it be conferred on or worked on, and the status conferred by a person acting on behalf of the artworld. At first sight, his theory seems strange but by a close examination the formulation of it is not so different from what traditional art theories have availed. For it will be noticed that both properties are relational ones like those of representational feature in imitation theory (work's relation to its subject-matter outside it) and of exp~essive feature in expression theory (work's relation to its creator). In this sense, his institutional theory of art is an effort to overcome the limitations of traditional theories, keeping in mind the practices of the artworld, especially of the developments of the twentieth century in art such as dadaism, pop art, and happenings. If we accept the institutional nature of art in every works of art as he informs it to us, it will be obvious that the notion of the aesthetic object of the so called aesthetic attitude can hardly be maintained. According to him, aesthetic attitude is the notion which was founded on individual powers derived from bodily (or mental) structnres instead of social powers derived from social structures. Furthermore, it has been pointed out in various ways that the notion is a kind of myth or a phantom in the . 179 sense that it is empirically unbelievable. The significant notion, 'aesthetic attitude', contributed to establishing the notion of the peculiar aesthetic experience with its own identity has, therefore, no place in his theory. In short, what he intended is that it must be discarded as irrelevant. Taking this position, he wished to develope an institutional theory of aesthetic object by examining M.C. Beardsley's notion of it. Our intention of introducing Dickie here is to discuss not the truth of his theory, but the motives with which he had to suggest the institutional theory of art. It was by pointing out and trying to overcome the structural limitations of traditional art theories that he came to the theory, but it seems to us that his way of thinking is not the only one to overcome the limitations. The more detailed analysis of the referents and philosophical presuppositions, by which traditional art theories became structurally limited, will show that the concept of performance could be the locus of a new aesthetic theory. For performance, in my opinion, can be explained as an activity with the moment into which work of art, perceiver and artist are to be integrated