Moral framing in dictator games by short

Recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when information regarding recipient is provided. But the lack of information disincentives other-regarding behavior and then, the subject’s behavior closely approximates the game-theoretic prediction based on the selfishness assumption. This paper conducted four treatment of dictator games. We used one-room design, between-subjects anonymity and extra-credit point as rewards. Two treatments were used as baseline whereas the other two were aimed at reinforcing the recipient powerlessness and positive reciprocity. To promote these environments we include a “non—neutral” sentence to the instructions. Our baseline and modified DG are statistically different from each other, indicating that the additional sentences promote other—regarding behaviour. In fact, pure-selfish behavior vanishes.Antonio J. Morales acknowledges financial support from MCYT and FEDER grant number BEC 2002-02852