Self-Involving Representationalism (SIR): A naturalistic Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness

A naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness is presented: Self-Involving Representationalism. The first step for the project of naturalizing phenomenal consciousness is to make the project itself feasible. The purpose of the fi rst part of this work is to provide a suitable answer to some arguments presented against this enterprise. I discuss the classical modal and knowledge argument and defend the phenomenal concept strategy against objection by Tye and Chalmers. I also consider some arguments from vagueness against the project. In the second part I will develop the pillars of the theory. In order to make compatible the intuition that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of the subject and explain cases of shifted spectrum I appeal following Shoemaker to appearance properties and I follow Egan in the characterization of this properties. According to Self-Involving Representationalism, phenomenally conscious mental states are states that represent a speci c kind of de se content. I argue that in having an experience I do not merely attribute certain properties to the object causing the experience, I attribute to myself being presented with an object with these properties. This content can be naturalized in rst-order terms by appealing to a certain sense of self: the sense of a bounded, living organism adapting to the environment to maintain life and the processes underlying the monitoring of the activity within these bounds