Conflict and cooperation within the UN Security Council

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Political Science, 2012.This dissertation explores how the rules and procedures of an international organization influence the decision-making process of the organization, and how the interests of member states affect its policy outcomes by focusing on the UN Security Council. It is structured in three essays, each of which analyzes the membership, the agenda, and the voting patterns of Council members. The first chapter examines which UN members are likely to become nominees and elected members of the Security Council, the second chapter explores which civil wars are more likely to come to the Council's agenda, and the third chapter investigates which Council members are more likely to support proposals imposing multilateral sanctions. In order to address these questions, I use both a game-theoretic model and quantitative techniques with newly collected data sets on the membership, the agenda, and the Council's roll-call votes. I argue and find that the membership of the Security Council is influenced by both the interests of the regional groups and the current procedures of the United Nations, that the interests of permanent members both increase and decrease the likelihood of a civil war entering the Council's agenda, and that even small powers can take an initiative in shaping Council's resolutions if there is a solidarity among these members and the decision-making process is not completely controlled by major powers.<