Add to ORKGWe prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities, for an arbitrary common discount factor. For general concave utilities, we prove existence and uniqueness of a "minimal" stationary equilibrium and of a "maximal" stationary equilibrium. We provide an example of multiple stationary equilibria with concave (non-quadratic) utilities
We study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by the points in the un...
The paper examines bargaining over a one–dimensional set of social states, with a unanimity acceptan...
International audienceThe purpose of this paper is to study the continuity and uniqueness properties...
We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferen...
We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient play-...
We study an alternating offers bargaining model in which the set of possible utility pairs evolves t...
We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient playe...
I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of ...
This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solu-tion and the equilib...
We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, a...
This paper takes up the foundational issue of existence of stationary subgame perfect equi-libria in...
This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibr...
The paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargain...
This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibr...
We study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by the points in the un...
We study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by the points in the un...
The paper examines bargaining over a one–dimensional set of social states, with a unanimity acceptan...
International audienceThe purpose of this paper is to study the continuity and uniqueness properties...
We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferen...
We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient play-...
We study an alternating offers bargaining model in which the set of possible utility pairs evolves t...
We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient playe...
I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of ...
This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solu-tion and the equilib...
We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, a...
This paper takes up the foundational issue of existence of stationary subgame perfect equi-libria in...
This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibr...
The paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargain...
This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibr...
We study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by the points in the un...
We study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by the points in the un...
The paper examines bargaining over a one–dimensional set of social states, with a unanimity acceptan...
International audienceThe purpose of this paper is to study the continuity and uniqueness properties...