Add to ORKGEvolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189-206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, F., 2001. Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ. Theory 17, 141-162] provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process
It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combinatio...
We analyze evolutionary games with replicator dynamics that have frequency dependent stage games. In...
The concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a useful tool for studying the dynamics of n...
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...
The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this p...
Oechssler J, Riedel F. Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces. Economic Theory. 2001;7:14...
This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents...
The classical replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in infinite populations formulated by Taylo...
This paper provides definitions for the evolutionary stability of sets of strategies based on simple...
International audienceWe review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Sta...
The concept of evolutionary stable strategies is extended to include density dependence. Dynamical s...
We introduce notions of evolutionary stability for sets of strategies based on the following require...
This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents...
Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the ex...
It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combinatio...
We analyze evolutionary games with replicator dynamics that have frequency dependent stage games. In...
The concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a useful tool for studying the dynamics of n...
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...
The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this p...
Oechssler J, Riedel F. Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces. Economic Theory. 2001;7:14...
This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents...
The classical replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in infinite populations formulated by Taylo...
This paper provides definitions for the evolutionary stability of sets of strategies based on simple...
International audienceWe review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Sta...
The concept of evolutionary stable strategies is extended to include density dependence. Dynamical s...
We introduce notions of evolutionary stability for sets of strategies based on the following require...
This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents...
Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the ex...
It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combinatio...
We analyze evolutionary games with replicator dynamics that have frequency dependent stage games. In...
The concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a useful tool for studying the dynamics of n...