Add to ORKGThis paper discusses several incentive models. Some models are only appropriate for risk neutral agents, but not for risk averse agents. For certain circumstances, a quadratic model is needed to replace a linear model The choice of which model is the appropriate one is the question addressed by this paper. Risk attitude and several aspects of asymmetric information will be discussed
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of individual risk preferences on t...
Compensation schemes have been blamed for encouraging excess risk-taking on the part of managers wit...
Performance-sensitivity of compensation schemes for portfolio managers is well explained by classic ...
ABSTRACT This paper discusses several incentive mirk& Some models are only appropriate for risk neut...
A central tenet of economics is that people respond to incentives. While an appropriately crafted in...
A central tenet of economics is that people respond to incentives. While an appropriately crafted in...
A central tenet of economics is that people respond to incentives. While an appropriately crafted in...
It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with super...
It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superi...
This paper explores the effects of costly information and asymmetry in reward and penalty on an agen...
In many economic situations several principals contract with the same agents sequentially. Asymmetri...
It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superi...
In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimall...
In the context of a canonical agency mo del, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimal...
Truth-inducing incentive schemes are used to motivate project managers to provide unbiased project i...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of individual risk preferences on t...
Compensation schemes have been blamed for encouraging excess risk-taking on the part of managers wit...
Performance-sensitivity of compensation schemes for portfolio managers is well explained by classic ...
ABSTRACT This paper discusses several incentive mirk& Some models are only appropriate for risk neut...
A central tenet of economics is that people respond to incentives. While an appropriately crafted in...
A central tenet of economics is that people respond to incentives. While an appropriately crafted in...
A central tenet of economics is that people respond to incentives. While an appropriately crafted in...
It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with super...
It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superi...
This paper explores the effects of costly information and asymmetry in reward and penalty on an agen...
In many economic situations several principals contract with the same agents sequentially. Asymmetri...
It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superi...
In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimall...
In the context of a canonical agency mo del, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimal...
Truth-inducing incentive schemes are used to motivate project managers to provide unbiased project i...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of individual risk preferences on t...
Compensation schemes have been blamed for encouraging excess risk-taking on the part of managers wit...
Performance-sensitivity of compensation schemes for portfolio managers is well explained by classic ...