Evaluation of global positioning system (GPS) performance during simplistic GPS spoofing attacks

This study is aimed at evaluating Global Positioning System (GPS) performance during simplistic GPS spoofing attacks, whereby spoofing is conducted using a standalone GPS simulator, which at present poses the greatest near-term threat. The study is conducted on two handheld GPS receiversGarmin GPSmap 60CSx (evaluated GPS receiver) and Garmin GPSmap 60CS (reference GPS receiver). Both receivers employ the GPS L1 coarse acquisition (C/A) signal. Varying minimum spoofing signal power levels, times between position fix lost and spoofing, and probable error patterns are observed for different dates and times. This is due to the GPS satellite constellation being dynamic, causing varying GPS satellite geometry over time, resulting in GPS performance being time dependent. Variation in other GPS error parameters, including ionospheric and tropospheric delays, satellite clock, ephemeris and multipath errors, and unintentional signal interferences and obstructions, could have also resulted in the variation of GPS performance. As the spoofing signal power level is increased, probable error values increase due to decreasing carrier-to-noise density (C/N0) levels for GPS satellites tracked by the receiver. For all the readings, the highest probable errors occur at the minimum spoofing power levels. After spoofing takes place, the probable errors reduce to levels that are lower as compared to prior to transmission of the spoofing signal, as at this point, the spoofing signal power levels are relatively large, resulting in high C/N0 levels and hence, improved accuracy