Add to ORKGThis paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games
Abstract. This paper compares two methodologies that have been used to understand the evolution of b...
Abstract — Bargaining is a fundamental activity in social life. Game-theoretic methodology has provi...
This paper explores the possibility of using evolutionary algorithms (EAs) to automatically generate...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
Equilibrium selection in the Nash demand game is investigated in a learning context with persistent ...
This paper studies the dynamic and equilibrium-selecting behavior of a multi-agent system consisting...
Game-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect ...
The simple Nash demand game is analysed in an evolutionary context. The evolutionarily stable strate...
The Thesis applies evolutionary game theoretic ideas to the modelling of economic behaviour. The tra...
Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. ...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
We study equilibrium selection in stochastic evolutionary bargaining games in which idiosyn-cratic p...
I study the evolutionary stability of behavioural rules in a bargaining game. Individuals draw rando...
Recent literature in evolutionary game theory is devoted to the question of robust equilibrium selec...
This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the learni...
Abstract. This paper compares two methodologies that have been used to understand the evolution of b...
Abstract — Bargaining is a fundamental activity in social life. Game-theoretic methodology has provi...
This paper explores the possibility of using evolutionary algorithms (EAs) to automatically generate...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
Equilibrium selection in the Nash demand game is investigated in a learning context with persistent ...
This paper studies the dynamic and equilibrium-selecting behavior of a multi-agent system consisting...
Game-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect ...
The simple Nash demand game is analysed in an evolutionary context. The evolutionarily stable strate...
The Thesis applies evolutionary game theoretic ideas to the modelling of economic behaviour. The tra...
Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. ...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
We study equilibrium selection in stochastic evolutionary bargaining games in which idiosyn-cratic p...
I study the evolutionary stability of behavioural rules in a bargaining game. Individuals draw rando...
Recent literature in evolutionary game theory is devoted to the question of robust equilibrium selec...
This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the learni...
Abstract. This paper compares two methodologies that have been used to understand the evolution of b...
Abstract — Bargaining is a fundamental activity in social life. Game-theoretic methodology has provi...
This paper explores the possibility of using evolutionary algorithms (EAs) to automatically generate...