Age structure and cooperation in coevolutionary games on dynamic network

Our proposed model imitates the growth of a population and describes the age structure and the level of cooperation in games on dynamic network with continuous changes of structure and topology. The removal of nodes and links caused by age-dependent attack, together with the nodes addition standing for the newborns of population, badly ruins Matthew effect in this coevolutionary process. Though the network is generated by growth and preferential attachment, it degenerates into random network and it is no longer heterogeneous. When the removal of nodes and links is equal to the addition of nodes and links, the size of dynamic network is maintained in steady-state, so is the low level of cooperation. Severe structure variation, homogeneous topology and continuous invasion of new defection jointly make dynamic network unsuitable for the survival of cooperator even when the probability with which the newborn players initially adopt the strategy cooperation is high, while things change slightly when the connections of newborn players are restricted. Fortunately, moderate interactions in a generation trigger an optimal recovering process to encourage cooperation. The model developed in this paper outlines an explanation of the cohesion changes in the development process of an organization. Some suggestions for cooperative behavior improvement are given in the end