Dretske And The Problem Of Qualia [dretske E O Problema Dos Qualia]

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss Fred Dretske's (1995) suggestion for analysis of the problem of qualia. Such a problem was acknowledged following Thomas Nagel's discussion in his classical paper "What is it like to be a bat". In the paper, Nagel (1974) postulates the impossibility of knowing aspects of human experience from a third-person perspective. He considers that qualitative aspects of a subject's experience, fundamental for characterization of qualia, would be lost during the course of objective descriptions of it. Based on his Representational Thesis of Mind, Dretske argues that if we were to consider mind to be the representational aspect of the brain, the nature of qualia would thus be representational. In this context, mental facts related to experiences would be representational facts: if we were to know the nature of these representational facts, we would also know the experience the system represents. Given this understanding, we discuss to what extent the Dretskean proposal constitutes (or not) an alternative for the problem of qualia.2536305322Abrantes, P., Naturalismo em filosofia da mente, , In: FERREIRA, A.;Gonzalez, M.E.Q., Coelho, J.G., Encontro com as ciências cognitivas (2004) Marília: Ed. da Unesp, 4, pp. 5-37Adams, F., The informational turn in philosophy. Minds and machines (2003) Netherlands: Kluer Academic Publishers, 13, pp. 471-501Block, N., Inverted earth (1990) Philosophical Perspectives, 4, pp. 53-79. , doi:10.2307/2214187Canal, R., Moraes, J.A., Chalmers e Searle nos estudos da consciência: algum avanço? (2009) Ciências e Cognição, 14 (2), pp. 262-275Chalmers, D.J., Facing up to the problem of consciousness (1995) Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, pp. 200-219Chalmers, D.J., (1996) The conscious mind, , Oxford: Oxford University PressDennett, D., (1996) Kinds of minds, , Basic books: New YorkDescartes, R., Discurso do método (1973) In: DESCARTES, R. Obras escolhidas. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, pp. 39-103Dretske, F., (1981) Knowledge and the flow of information, , Oxford: Blackwell PublisherDretske, F., (1995) Naturalizing the mind, , Cambridge: MIT PressGonzalez, M.E.Q., Broens, M.C., Moraes, J.A.A., virada informacional na Filosofia: alguma novidade no estudo da mente? (2010) Revista de Filosofia Aurora, 22 (30), pp. 137-151. , jan./junGonzalez, M.E.Q., Moraes, J.A., Complexidade e privacidade informacional: um estudo na perspectiva sistêmica In: GONZALEZ, M. E. Q.Pellegrini, A. M.Andrade, R. C. S. (Org). Auto-organização: estudos interdisciplinares, , Campinas: Ed. da Unicamp. Coleção CLE. (No prelo)Heil, J., Filosofia da mente? uma introdução contemporânea (2001) Lisboa: Inst. PiagetLevine, J., Materialism and Qualia: the explanatory gap (1983) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, pp. 354-361Nagel, T., (1974) What is it like to be a bat, , http://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1000/Nagel.pdf, Disponível em Acesso em: 23 nov. 2009Peacocke, C., (2011) Sense and content, , http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~paulsko/papers/PlaceCBP.pdf, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. PLACE, U. T. Is consciousness a brain process?. 1956. Disponível Acesso em: 4 abrSearle, J., Intentionality (1983), Cambridge: Cambridge University PressTeixeira, J.F.O., (1994) que é filosofia da mente, , http://www.filosofiadamente.org/images/stories/pdf/o_que_e_filosofia_da_mente.pdf, Disponível em Acesso em: 4 abrTye, M., Qualia (2007) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, , http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/, Disponível em: Acesso em: 11 ab