Cash holdings and industrial background of outside directors

本研究欲探討日本企業之現金持有是否會因董事會中之外部董事曾經或現有銀行、主要往來銀行、證券、保險業之背景或經驗，而有所影響。日本企業主要透過間接金融之方式籌措資金，其主要監督者並非資本市場，而為該企業之主要債權人-銀行。日本銀行在對其客戶執行高風險之策略或投資時會施予適當之關注，甚至視情況派員進入其董事會進行干預。因此，企業董事會中之外部董事如有具有銀行或主要往來銀行之背景者，可推測銀行對於該企業之控制力較大，因而使該企業現金持有較多。本研究實證結果發現企業董事會之外部董事有具有銀行或主要往來銀行之背景或經驗者，其現金持有會高於無該等外部董事之企業，且主要往來銀行之影響更甚於非主要往來銀行。In this study, I investigate the relation between corporate cash holdings and the industrial background of the outside directors in Japan. Indirect finance has been dominating in Japan for decades. The banking system, not the capital market, has played the role disciplining firms. Banks in Japan also have the practice of appointing directors to the board of their client firms. We therefore conjecture that firms with outside directors who have previous bank affiliations will have more cash holdings. The results show that firms with outside directors who have previous bank affiliation tend to have higher cash holding level. The results are stronger when such bank affiliation is a main bank affiliation