The Regulatory Reform of Electricity Sector in Japan

本文主要目的在於以日本的電力產業為案例，探討東亞國家的經濟管制改革經驗，有鑒於日本在電力產業管制的失靈導致了電力零售市場自由化效果有限及人為安全管制疏失造成福島核災，本研究要回答的問題是：如何解釋日本電力產業的管制失靈？在福島核災的影響下，為何核電安全與電力市場管制體系出現不同程度的制度變遷？透過檔案與文獻資料的分析，作者發現制度設計的瑕疵是管制失靈的主因，而在鐵三角網絡的運作下造成的管制俘虜也可以解釋為什麼會產生這些制度。在福島核災後，由於主要行為者的偏好並未改變，因此核電安全管制的改革效果有限，在電力市場自由化改革方面，由於行為者的合作模式受到挑戰，METI與用電大戶的企業一起促成電力市場制度改革。The main purpose of this thesis is to study the experience of regulatory reform in East Asia. By examining Japan’s electricity industry, this thesis answers the question that how to explain the regulatory failure in the power sector in Japan, including the government failed to establish a competitive electricity market and to prevent the 311 disaster in Fukushima. This thesis also illustrates the various impacts of Fukushima tragedy on the nuclear safety regulations and the structure of electricity market in Japan. Based on the research findings, the author argues that the failure in regulations results from the flawed institutions which were formulated through “regulatory capture” done by the interaction among “iron triangle” in the electricity sector. After the nuclear disaster, the vested interests did not shift their preference in the nuclear industry, which led to the limited reform in nuclear safety regulations. The structure of electricity market has changed better than nuclear safety regulations because of the competition-oriented policies implemented by METI