The Impact of Anti-thin Capitalization Rules on the Capital Structure of Taiwanese Multinational Firms

由於許多公司會利用資本弱化來從事跨國利潤移轉，各國政府因而相繼制定反資本弱化條款，在稅務上限縮公司可減除的利息費用，以防堵企業規避稅負。惟多數探討反資本弱化條款有效性的實證文獻，都是以地主國的觀點看外來投資。 不同於之前文獻偏重探討某一特定國家 (大多數是歐美國家) 的反資本弱化條款是否會改變其境內公司之資本結構，本文則是以居住國的觀點，探討 2008 年至 2012 年台灣電子製造業的上市公司與其國內外關係企業的資本結構，是否會受到其所在國的反資本弱化條款影響。另外，基於內部債務和外部債務間的替代性，本文進一步將負債區分為內部債務與外部債務，以期能更細部了解公司的融資行為。 本文共分為四個模型：以模型一、二分析反資本弱化條款對公司內部債務的影響；以模型三、四分析反資本弱化條款對公司外部債務的影響。實證結果發現，處罰方式若為重分類為股利，會造成公司的內部債務比率下降15.45%，外部債務比率上升 27.66%。而安全港比率中的分子若指所有負債，會造成公司的外部債務比率下降 14%。此外，反資本弱化條款的施行對公司外部債務比率的影響取決於處罰方式和安全港比率中負債的定義。最後，若安全港比率的分子僅指關係人間負債，公司仍可透過增加外部債務的方式，繼續享受利息費用的稅盾效果。Because many companies shift their profits through debt financing, governments had imposed anti-thin capitalization rules one after another to limit the tax deductibility of interest expenses. However, most empirical researches on the effectiveness of the anti-thin capitalization rules are from host countries perspectives. Different from previous literature focusing on how the anti-thin capitalization rule of one country affects capital structures of companies in that country, this paper is from a home country perspective to analyze the effects of the anti-thin capitalization rules on capital structures of Taiwanese listed companies (Electronics manufacturing industry) and their affiliates over the period 2008-2012. This paper subdivides debt into internal debt and external debt on account of the substitution between them so that it would help us to understand financing behavior of companies in depth. Model 1 and Model 2 are to investigate how anti-thin capitalization rules affect internal debt of companies. Model 3 and Model 4 are to investigate how anti-thin capitalization rules affect external debt of companies. The findings indicate that reclassifying excess interest as dividends reduces a company’s internal debt ratio by 15.45% and increases its external debt ratio by 27.66%. Defining the numerator of the safe haven ratio as total debt reduces a company’s external debt ratio by 14%. Moreover, how the enforcement of the anti-thin capitalization rule affects a company’s external debt ratio depends on the penalty and the definition of the debt measure in the numerator of the safe haven ratio. Finally, if the numerator of the safe haven ratio refers to related-parties debt, a company may still make good use of the tax shields of interest expenses by increasing external debt