Essays on Financial Reform, Regulation and Dynamic Efficiency of Commercial Banks from Taiwan or China’s Perspective

為解決臺灣層金融機構經營不善問題，政府於2001年7月成立金融重建基金(financial restructuring fund)，主要是讓淨值為負的金融機構退出市場。金融重建基金是以概括承受及公開標售方式處理問題金融機構，在政府提供法規誘因下，銀行在衡量自身經營狀況後，進而決定是否在「金融重建基金設置及管理條例」實施期間參與合併案。而是否參與合併對銀行而言是一項重大且長遠之決策，公司經營管理階層及董事會於併購程序中所應盡之義務，對股東權益之保障益顯得重要。本文先研究「金融重建基金設置及管理條例」實施期間，台灣銀行參與或不參與金融重建合併機制的公司治理特質及其對合併靜態與動態效率的影響。 再者，金融監理的目的主要是使銀行提高流動性和清償能力，進而防範銀行倒閉，但實施(或較嚴謹)銀行監管是否會減損效率？亦或有助於銀行經營效率的提升 ？本文接著研究中國金融監管的特質及其對上市銀行靜態與動態效率的影響，亦進一步探討金融監管對銀行效率與風險的抉擇(trade-off)關係。有別於過去文獻多著重於公司治理或金融監管與效率當期效果(concurrent effect)的靜態研究，我們進一步使用Tone and Tsutsui (2010)的動態差額變數基礎模型(Dynamic Slacks-Based Measure；DSBM)，分析公司治理或金融監管改變對銀行動態效率(dynamic efficiency) 的影響是否存在時間遞延(time-deferred)效果。 實證結果顯示，無論是否參與金融重建合併機制之主併銀行，在金融重建實施期間，席次控制比例都明顯增加，這顯示控制股東對於是否參與金融重建機制下的合併具有更大的決策能力。參與金融重建機制之主併銀行，短期內雖然會造成合併後靜態與動態效率的減損，但長期在有效掌握公司運作的前提下，合併效率可望逐漸提升改善。此觀察與控制股東決定合併與否，是以追求銀行長期效率提升為目標的假說一致。本研究亦突顯公司治理，在金融重建機制下，對銀行合併靜態與動態效率之重要性。 存貸比及流動性比率皆對利潤及動態效率有影響，但大小銀行顯著結果並不一致；大銀行之撥備覆蓋率愈高，風險愈低，但對小銀行沒有顯著影響；成本收入比愈高，動態及利潤效率愈差，但對小銀行之風險沒有影響，確會使大銀行之風險增加。這表示小銀行和上市銀行對資產品質(即不良貸款)之風險控管能力有所不同，相較於小銀行，大銀行較有風險抵禦的能力，但宜留意成本控制問題。不論是資本充足率或是一級資本充足率皆不會影響銀行的利潤效率，但就小銀行而言，資本充足率愈高，風險愈低；貸款撥備率及槓桿比率對利潤效率為顯著正向影響，並沒有對銀行之利潤及資產擴張經營模式形成限制。 所以，金融監管除對中國商業銀行效率有影響，也影響銀行的經營理念、發展策略和經營發展方式的改變。在《巴塞爾協議Ⅲ》的實施下，大陸商業銀行銀行必須改變依靠貸款規模擴張獲取利潤的經營發展方式，致力於經營發展方式的轉型。由上述分析得知，中國銀監會應從金融風險防範的角度，在考量銀行經營現狀下，對不同資產規模的銀行實施差異化監管。The Financial Restructuring Fund provides a bank make the important decision of whether to merge the problem bank, through the market mechanism. To protect shareholder equity, the obligation of bank management and the board of directors in the merger process are important.The study examines how the financial restructuring scheme affects corporate governance of acquiring banks under or without the restructuring scheme, and whether corporate governance makes a difference in static and dynamic efficiency for bank mergers during implementation of the Financial Restructuring Fund Statute in Taiwan. The goal of financial regulation is to enable banks to improve liquidity and solvency. Stricter regulation may be good for bank stability, but not for bank efficiency. This research aims to explore how the previously implemented financial regulations have affected bank efficiency in the past. In addition, we also explored the trade-off relationship between efficiency and risk. Unlike other literatures only investigating the characteristics of corporate governance (bank regulation) that affect the concurrent static efficiency of bank, we further use dynamic slacks-based measure (DSBM) to study the persistent and intertemporal effects on the dynamic efficiency of bank in the long run. In addition, this study used bank assets as a classification standard from the financial risk and differential regulatory perspective. Our results show that major shareholders of acquiring banks had greater controlling power to decide whether to merge during the financial restructuring period. During the financial restructuring period, a bank merger using the financial restructuring scheme had less static and dynamic efficiency in the short run, but gradually increased in the long run. Such an observation is consistent with the hypothesis that controlling shareholders pursue long-term efficiency in a bank merger. The ability to control risks and asset quality for large and small banks is different. The large banks have greatly enhanced the ability to resist risk and identify the customer to whom to lend funds. In addition, the large banks should pay more attention to the cost of control than small banks should. The purpose of CBRC regulates the current ratio is to reduce the risks of banks. Based on our empirical results, the current ratio did not affect the risks and led to different efficiency results between large and small banks. We also find the capital adequacy did not a significantly affect bank’s static efficiency. It seems the new capital requirements may not swallow their profits and lead to a decline in return. To attain the requirement of Basel III, China commercial banks must change the profit model which depends on expand the scale of assets and purse the transformation of business development. From the risk-prevention point of view, the CBRC should adopt differentiated financial regulation policies for banks of different asset sizes according to the operating status