The effect of mandatory auditor assignment on audit quality and audit fees in China

本研究探討中國國務院國有資產監督管理委員會(國資委)，實施統一委託審計之規範對於中央國有企業審計品質及審計公費的影響。國資委於2004年發布有關統一委託審計的規定，要求中央國有企業的年度財務決算審計須由國資委統一委託會計師事務所進行，並規定會計師事務所的審計年限必須介於2~5年之間，本研究欲探討此規定對中央國有企業審計品質及審計公費的影響。具體而言，本研究以異常應計數作為審計品質的代理變數，並使用差異中的差異法檢驗統一委託審計的影響，研究樣本為2001~2009年中國滬深A股上市公司。實證結果顯示，就審計品質而言，實施統一委託審計後中央國有企業的審計品質有提升，但其中會計師事務所的審計年限規定並未對審計品質造成明顯影響；就審計公費而言，實施統一委託審計後中央國有企業的審計公費下降，且在市場發展程度愈低的地區效果愈明顯。This paper examines the effect of regulations on audit quality and audit fees in China. China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) issued some rules in 2004 to improve audit quality for state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government (CSOEs), such as SASAC Order No. 5 and SASAC Rule No. 173. Under these rules, SASAC mandatorily assign auditors for CSOEs, and CSOEs’ managers have to retain auditors for at least 2 years and at most 5 years. This paper investigates listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2009, and uses abnormal accruals as proxy for audit quality and a difference-in-differences design to examine the effect of these rules on audit quality and audit fees. The empirical results suggest that after the enactment of these rules, the audit quality for CSOEs relative to other companies improves and the audit fees for CSOEs relative to other companies reduce