R&D, Inside Directors, and Firm Performance

本研究同時考量代理理論及資源依賴理論之觀點，認為內部董事雖因任職於公司而造成其獨立性受損，監督誘因較低，但內部董事因具備有企業特定知識與內部有用資訊，故可有效評估策略並作成適當決策，尤以在高R&D投入之企業中，更需要具備企業特定知識之人，因此，本研究探討R&D支出與內部董事席次比率間之關係，並進一步分析R&D對內部董事與經營績效關聯性之影響。 實證結果顯示，高R&D投入與內部董事席次比率間呈顯著正相關，表示在R&D密度高的公司中，其公司的董事會中會有較高的內部董事席次。在高R&D密度的公司，內部董事席次比率與公司經營績效呈顯著正向關係。表示在高研發投入公司，公司特定專業知識之需求較高，內部董事資源提供之功能強於監督之需求，因而有較多內部董事席次之公司會有較佳之經營績效。This paper considered both agency theory and resource-dependence theory. Although hired by the firm, inside directors may have lower monitoring incentives, they have firm-specific knowledge and useful information and can evaluate strategies effectively and make better decisions. Especially in those high-R&D firms need firm-specific knowledge, therefore, this paper examines the relationship between R&D and the percentage of inside director, and also examines the relationship between inside director and firm performance in high-R&D firms. The empirical results finds that R&D and inside director are significantly positive. It shows that high-R&D firms will have higher percentage of inside directors in their boards. And the empirical results also finds that in high-R&D firms, they will have more specific professional knowledge need, and inside directors’ resource-provision function is stronger than the monitoring function, therefore, firms with higher percentage of inside directors will have better firm performance