THE KEY 71-days Period -The Taiwan society and Taiwanese Movement around the end of W.W.Ⅱ

1945年8月15日二次大戰結束至10月25日台灣「光復」之間，台灣究竟屬於何種狀態？過去戰後初期研究往往直接探討國民政府與台灣人之間的族群對立，以及二二八事件發生之社會因素等課題，並未探討日本戰敗對台灣帶來的涵義及此71日的「真空時期」。因此本論文將以戰爭結束前後至國民政府來台接收前為觀察範圍，探索當時的台灣社會與台灣人之動向。 戰爭結束前，在台灣總督府嚴密統制下，大部分台灣人無法獲知「開羅宣言」之存在，也對戰局趨勢並未持有正確的預見。因此台灣島內的台灣人於戰爭結束前並未有面對日本戰敗，以及台灣歸還中華民國之心理準備，直至1945年8月15日戰爭結束，台灣人依舊與日本的帝國主義政策聯繫著。戰爭結束當天，因為收聽廣播之環境相當有限，透過「玉音放送」獲知戰爭結束及日本戰敗的人並不多，甚至有部分人士將之誤解為天皇激勵繼續作戰之宣傳。 然而透過台灣總督府之公告、媒體報導以及人人口耳相傳，日本戰敗之消息終究得以傳達至台灣島內。戰爭結束後，一方面日本統治最高機關的台灣總督府以及約15-17萬的日本軍仍然留駐台灣，掌控台灣社會；但另一方面，隨著中國來台之消息遍及台灣，日本當局逐漸失去威信，在治安、經濟方面皆出現惡化趨勢。在如此狀況下，台灣知識份子憑藉各自思想與做法，為台灣未來四處奔走。如林獻堂，採取較為慎重態度，一方面與日本當局保持良好關係，一方面致力維持治安。吳新榮則對新時代懷有莫大期待，著手於三青團之組織，積極地展開迎接「祖國」之事宜。然而當時台灣人對中國懷有的「祖國認同」，並非具有現實經驗，也是未經理性思考的觀念。當他們實際與中國接觸時，難免顯露陌生與失望之感。儘管如此，強烈的「祖國認同」仍舊支撐著台灣人擁護中國的熱情。 以辜振甫、許丙為首的所謂「八‧一五獨立事件」，過去大部分研究皆認為其主因為日本軍煽動，少數研究則否定日本軍之參與。本論文使用私人日記、回憶錄、新聞報導等的資料，再次探討此事件之相關人物的言行及背後因素，並認為此事件實為日本軍與台灣人共謀的一場歷史事件。 台灣與日本、中國兩者之間的關係，無論於日治時期或戰爭結束後，皆對台灣命運具有相當深刻之影響。發生於時代轉換之際的「八‧一五獨立事件」，恰好表現其一端。透過本論文，筆者希望再度仔細探討台灣近代史的複雜性，以及對今日台灣境遇之影響。Between August 15, 1945-- the official end of World War II-- and October 25-- the date Taiwan underwent “retrocession” into China-- what was the political situation in Taiwan? Past post-war studies often discuss the ethical conflict between the Nationalist Government and native Taiwanese as well as the social reasons surrounding the the 2-28 Incident, but often fail to mention the meaning of Japan’s defeat for Taiwan and the 71-day “vacuum period” following the Japanese surrender. Therefore, the research period of this thesis is set between the end of World War II and the Nationalist Government takeover of Taiwan. It discusses Taiwanese society and the Taiwanese movement of this period. By the war’s end, most Taiwanese neither knew about the “Cairo Declarations,” due to the strict censorship of the Governor-General of Taiwan, nor could they foresee the results of the war. Consequently, most Taiwanese were completely unprepared for Japan’s defeat and Taiwan’s retrocession. Until the war was over on August 15, Taiwanese were completely subject to Japanese imperialist edicts. The day the war was over, because the broadcast system was so limited, few people heard news of Japan’s defeat through the “Jewel Voice Broadcast,” otherwise known as the “Gyokuon-hōsō.” Some people even mistook the broadcast as the emperor’s call to continue fighting. But finally, news of Japan’s defeat spread throughout the island via the Governor-General’s notice, news media reports, and word of mouth. And while the Governor-General and between 150,000 and 170,000 Japanese troops stayed in Taiwan to control Taiwanese society, as news of approaching Chinese troops spread, the Japanese authority gradually lost prestige. Public order and the economy began to deteriorate. Under such circumstances, the Taiwanese elite looked to their own ideas and methods for the future running of Taiwan. For example, Lin Xiantang (林獻堂) conservatively maintained good relations with the Japanese authority on one hand, but on the other hand, devoted himself to protecting social order. Wu Xinrong (吳新榮), eagerly anticipating the coming new era, started to organize the Youth League of the Three People’s Principals, aggressively preparing for the welcome of the “Motherland.” Nevertheless, the “ancestral identity” that Taiwanese felt toward China was, at the time, an idea lacking both experiential and rational bases. Therefore, those Taiwanese coming into contact with Chinese found it hard to avoid feelings of unfamiliarity and disappointment. However that may be, a strong idea of “ancestral identity” continued to prop up Taiwanese support and enthusiasm for China. Regarding the “8-15 Taiwanese Independence Incident,” which Gu Zhenfu (辜振甫) and Xu Bing (許丙) allegedly masterminded, most past studies consider this an intrigue stirred up by Japanese troops, while a smaller number of studies completely deny Japanese involvement. This dissertation uses private diaries, memoirs and news reports to examine the words and deeds of the players, and the background reasons for the incident, finding it to be an historical event in which Japanese troops and the Taiwanese elite conspired together. Whether during the period of Japanese rule or during the post-war period, the relationships between Taiwan and Japan, and Taiwan and China both have significant meanings for Taiwan’s fate. Occurring at the juncture of two political rules, the “8-15 Taiwanese Independence Incident” neatly reveals this point. Through this dissertation, the author hopes to examine in greater detail the complexity of Taiwan’s recent history and the effect this history has had on Taiwan’s current political situation