The Effect of International Politics on Exchange Rate Regime and Policies: the Case of Chinese Currency

本論文討論的問題是，國際政治因素對於匯率體制與政策有沒有影響？如果有影響，則國際政治因素如何影響匯率體制與匯率政策變化？國際政治因素影響匯率體制與匯率政策變化的程度有多大？我們希望透過以上問題的探討確認國際政治因素與匯率體制和匯率變化有無關係，然後分析國際政治因素透過怎樣的方式與機制來影響匯率體制與匯率政策，進而瞭解匯率變動與國際政治因素之間的因果關係為何？ 在上述問題下，我們有以下的研究假說： （一）匯率體制與名目匯率的變動除了受國內政治因素與經濟因素的影響外，國際政治因素對於匯率的變動亦是有影響。 （二）政府對於匯率政策的思考除了考量國內政治與經濟因素外，也考慮國際政治壓力因素。 （三）市場交易者對於匯率的預期與作為，除了受到總體經濟指標與國內政治局勢發展的影響外，也受到國際政治情勢變化的影響。 （四）國際貿易失衡下，貿易順差國對貿易逆差國依賴度上升，假如貿易逆差國為一強權國家，則強權國家會對貿易順差國有影響力。例如，兩國（A與B兩國）貿易失衡，A國在貿易順差累積大量外匯存底情況下，勢必會使得該國對於B國貿易依賴程度加深。在貿易失衡情況下，如果B國為強權國家，龐大貿易逆差的B國對於A國將會產生影響力。 在這些研究問題與假說下，本文將以人民幣匯率作為研究個案，藉由個案探討去回答上述問題。所以，我們探討人民幣匯率與匯率體制是否受到國際政治壓力？其次是國際社會如何對人民幣施壓？第三是中國政府與決策者如何反應？第四是市場如何反應與考量國際壓力對匯率的影響？最後是提出初步研究結果與結論。 根據本文研究，針對本文研究問題，我們認為： 首先，國際政治因素對匯率體制與名目匯率有沒有影響？而根據研究結果，我們的答案是肯定的。不過這個肯定的答案必須建構在下面的假設上，第一是兩國必須處於貿易失衡的關係，同時貿易逆差國為一強權國家。其次是在假設一之下，政府對匯率政策的思維不只是考量國內經濟與國內政治，也考量國際政治壓力。 其次第二個問題是國際政治因素如何影響匯率體制與匯率水平的變化。根據研究顯示，國際政治影響匯率體制與匯率水平的方式包括：公開施壓、雙邊高層官員會談、國際會議聯合施壓、甚至貿易制裁手段。通常首先透過公開發言的方式對貿易順差國施壓，要求貿易順差國對於經貿失衡現象做出相應措施，其中以調整匯率為主要要求，其次進一步透過雙邊高層官員直接面對面討論相關議題，藉由談判過程直接施加壓力，第三，則是在國際會議場合中和其他國家聯手施壓，對於匯率議題表達一致的立場形成聯合壓力，去迫使貿易順差國調整匯率制度與水平。第四則是威脅貿易制裁，透過提案以及口頭威脅貿易制裁方式，加重施壓的力道，對貿易順差國進一步施壓，最後則是實施貿易制裁。 第三個研究問題是國際政治因素影響匯率體制與名目匯率變化的程度有多大？從中國人民幣的案例中，我們可以發現，中國一開始面對來自國際壓力時就強硬表示不會改變現行匯率體制與水平。其強調由於中國本身經濟發展狀況與國內金融體制不健全，在加上美國貿易赤字並非完全中國所造成的，所以目前並沒有改變的需要。 但隨著不斷增加的雙邊貿易逆差與國際壓力，中國雖然仍沒有改變中國匯率體制與水平，但也開始改變表示願意思考人民幣改革的可能性並將人民幣完全自由浮動，完全由市場供需來決定作為最後終極目標。甚至到最後出其不意的改變人民幣匯率體制並升值2.1％。這顯示在中國改革人民幣過程中，國際政治因素扮演重要的角色，發揮重要影響力。因為在堅持不變的理由中，中國始終以國內經濟因素與中國內部穩定的政治性理由來拒絕國際社會的要求，但在最後改革的說帖中，中國也承認國際壓力是其推動匯率改革的重要因素，可見除了國內經濟與政治面向的考量外，國際政治因素也是具有重大影響力。This paper discusses whether exchange rate regimes and exchange rate policies are affected by international politics, as well as how international politics affect exchange rate regimes and exchange rates. By examining these questions, I would like to analyze the mechanism by which international politics affect exchange rates and figure out the relationship among exchange rate regime, policies and international politics. This paper puts forth four hypotheses. First of all, exchange rate regimes and exchange rates are not only affected by domestic politics and economic factors, but they are also affected by international politics. Second, decisions regarding exchange rate policies made by governments are based on international politics, domestic politics and economic factors. Third, the behavior and expectations of market traders are also affected by macro economic index, domestic political situation and international political situation. Forth, under bilateral trade imbalance, state B which is a great power and has large trade deficit with state A has influence on state A. State A and State B have an imbalance trade relationship. State A which has a large trade surplus will increase dependence on state B. Under these hypotheses, the author would like to answer the above questions by discussing the case of the Chinese currency, the Renminbi (RMB). Hence, the case study will ask the following questions. First of all, was the Chinese currency reform made on July 21, 2005 by the Chinese government affected by international politics? Second, how did the international community press the Chinese government to reform exchange rate regime? Third, how did the Chinese government respond to pressures from the international community and market? Fourth, how did market traders respond to and interpret interactions between the Chinese government and the international community. The research achieved the following results. First of all, under hypotheses two and four, exchange rate regimes and policies are affected by international politics. Second, ways which international politics affect exchange rates and regimes are through public pressure, bilateral official talks, trade sanctions, and oral threats. Public pressure is when a state with trade deficit asks a state which has trade surplus to adjust the exchange rate to reduce trade surplus. Bilateral official talks are when decision makers on both sides negotiate with each other for imbalance trade relationship. Exchange rate is an important dimension to negotiation. Trade sanctions are the last step to make the state which has trade surplus adjust exchange rate. Oral threats can be uses with the above mentioned measures. Third, in the case of RMB, the Chinese government rejected the international community’s request to adjust exchange and regime. Because of the weakness of China’s economic development and its unhealthy financial systems, the Chinese government rejected adjustments of exchange rate and regime under pressure from international communities. The Chinese government does not think that the undervalue of Chinese currency is the main reason of U.S. trade deficit and emphasized that there is no need to change RMB exchange rate and regime. With increasing trade surplus and pressure from international community, the Chinese government started to change its attitude towards the issue of RMB exchange rate. The Chinese government expressed that it was willing to consider the possibility of exchange rate reform, and movement of RMB exchange rate was fully determined by market forces. On July 21, 2005, the Chinese government adjusted regime and level of Chinese currency unexpectedly. The reform on July 21, 2005 implied that international politics played an important role in the exchange rate reform. Although the Chinese government denied that exchange rate reform was made under international pressure, international pressure is one of the main reasons behind the Chinese government changing the exchange rate policy according to the U.S. official’s testimony before the committee of Congress. The Chinese government reiterated that reform on July 21, 2005 was carried out according to the development of domestic economic development. But because of that, U.S. officials expressed that Chinese officials made a commitment of reform to them in bilateral talks, so we can understand that the international community has influence on the policy of exchange rate reform in addition to factors of domestic economy and politics