美國柯林頓政府的朝鮮半島安全政策:從薄富爾的「行動戰略」理論分析

自二次世界大戰結束以後，美國對朝鮮半島的安全政策經歷了不同的轉變。韓戰後各個時期的政府主要仍是以對南韓的安全承諾與〈美韓共同防衛條約〉的軍事嚇阻作為其政策與戰略的基石。冷戰後朝鮮半島遭遇了兩次核子危機，但是柯林頓政府卻改變政策，以合作與對話的方式試圖解決危機。小布希政府團隊在執政以前，對於柯林頓政府的作法始終抱持反對的態度，認為應該要對北韓採取強硬態度。但是隨著小布希政府執政、911事件的發生與反恐戰爭的進行，小布希政府對朝鮮半島安全政策卻採取了與柯林頓政府類似的作法。這種變化是否意味柯林頓政府在朝鮮半島安全政策上有其優點，值得後任政府效法。因此，本論文以薄富爾的「行動戰略」理論作為研究途徑，藉由政策與戰略選擇的分析、行動計畫中「政治診斷」與「戰略診斷」的研判，以及各種戰略行動模式的鋪陳，探討柯林頓政府時期的朝鮮半島安全政策。同時比較柯林頓和小布希政府政策與戰略上的差異與因襲，並分析當前情勢，嘗試提出未來可能的變化。 本論文發現，柯林頓政府對於北韓自始至終都是採取「交往與擴大」政策，希望能以「交往與擴大」政策將北韓拉回國際體系內，使其遵守國際體系的規範。小布希政府則是一開始採取典型的現實主義政策，不願意與北韓交往，因為典型現實主義者所重視的是和國際體系中強權國家之間關係的處理，而不是注重在衰敗國家或轉變中國家的事務。一直到911事件後才改採兼具現實主義與理想主義的新政策，對北韓的態度與作法才有所轉變。 柯林頓政府始終均是運用多邊主義的戰略行動。小布希政府最初對於北韓是「冷處理」的方式，不予理會，但是911事件之後，開始調整政策，在戰略也有所改變。小布希的戰略是所謂的「鷹派交往」。「鷹派交往」戰略和「選擇性交往」戰略比較貼近，但是二者還是有差異。雖然「鷹派交往」戰略和「選擇性交往」戰略的內涵均是以多邊主義的方式，聯合經過慎選的重要國家採取間接模式的總體戰略行動來追求政策目標，但是「鷹派交往」戰略卻對對手國更具有壓力，因為「鷹派交往」戰略在採取交往的同時，不忘記強硬的手段。換言之，「鷹派交往」戰略將交往的內容作為誘因，引誘對手國往本國所期望的方向行動，當其行動違反本國所欲時，這項誘因便可以隨時轉變成為懲罰的工具。從這點看來，小布希的戰略選擇，在戰略行動的產出上較柯林頓來得有效率。 由於戰略是「兩個對立意志使用力量以來解決其爭執時所用的辯證法藝術」，因此在決定戰略的選擇時必須考量敵我之間的各項資源、行動自由的大小，乃至於互動模式，這些都是在進行行動計畫，選取戰略之時，必須審慎考量的，否則便可能產生無法指導行動的戰略。柯林頓政府的戰略雖然立意甚佳，但卻沒有考慮到採取此種戰略是否能夠從中規劃出有效的行動模式，來維持原有的行動自由、並進一步爭取最大的行動自由。這是柯林頓政府朝鮮半島安全政策的缺憾。Since the end of World War II, There have been different changes in the U.S. Korean Peninsula security policy. During the post-Korean war era, each administration makes its policy and strategy on the basis of security promise to the South Korea and military deterrence toward the North with U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual Defense Treaty. There were two nuclear crises after the end of the cold war, but the Clinton administration changed its policy and tried to solve the problem in way of cooperation and dialog. Before taking office, George W. Bush’s team was against Clinton’s policy and declared that the United States should take coercive actions against the North Korea. However, since George W. Bush took office, 911 broke out and the war on terror was going on, the Bush administration took the similar policy on the Korean Peninsula security policy as the Clinton’s. Does this mean that Clinton’s policy may have goodness that worthy for the administrations after his to follow? Thus, I took Andr□ Beaufre’s “strategy of action” theory as my thesis study approach. Through the analysis on the choice of policy and strategy, the decision on “political diagnosis” and “strategic diagnosis” of action planning, and the display of each kind of strategic actions, this thesis analyzed the Korean Peninsula security policy in the Clinton era. At the same time, I compared the difference and continuance between the two administrations and analyzed the status quo trying to figure out the would-be changes in this thesis In the thesis I discovered that the Clinton administration took the “engagement and enlargement” policy from the beginning to the end, hoping that the policy would pull back the North Korea into the international system and make it follow the international order. At the beginning, Bush administration took the classical realist policy and was not willing to engage North Korea. Because the emphasis of classical realists is to deal with the relations among power nations, not paying attention to the affairs of declining and falling states. Not until the outbreak of 911 did the Bush administration take new policy composite with realism and idealism, and change the attitude toward North Korea. The Clinton administration undertook the strategic action in multi-polarity from the beginning to the end. Bush administration chose to ignore North Korea at the beginning, but changed his policy and strategy after the 911. What Bush undertook is called “Eagle Engagement Strategy”. “Eagle Engagement Strategy” is similar to “Selective Engagement Strategy” but there are still some differences between them. Though both Strategies unite those states carefully chosen and undertake indirect total strategic actions to chase the policy goals in multi-lateral way, the “Eagle Engagement Strategy” is much powerful in pressing the rival states. That is because when people undertake the “Eagle Engagement Strategy” to engage, there are still ways in coerciveness. In other words, the “Eagle Engagement Strategy” provides engagement as motive to make rival states undertake the way we wish. When the rival states do not follow our will, this motive may switch into the tool of punishment. In this point of view, the Bush administration’s strategy is more effective than the Clinton’s. The Clinton administration’s strategy was base on good will, but the Clinton administration did not considerate its effective action modes to maintain its original action freedom and chase the most action freedom by this strategy. To Clinton’s Korean Peninsula security policy it is a pity