Ownership, Protection, and Dividends

本文根據32個國家的資料，觀察是否代理問題嚴重的公司傾向發放較多股利。以股權集中度作為代理問題之代理變數，發現保護好的國家，以股權分散的公司居多，而在保護不好的國家，大部分的公司股權結構十分集中。所以在保護好的國家，主要是股東與經理人之間的代理問題，股權越分散，代理問題越大；而保護不好的國家，其主要的代理問題是介於大股東與小股東之間，股權越集中，代理問題越大。 最後結論得出：在投資人保護好的國家，股利發放與股權集中度呈現正向關係；而在投資人保護差的國家，股利發放與股權集中度則呈現負向關係。代表代理問題嚴重的公司傾向發放較多的股利，由於公司有外部融資的需求，儘管在投資人保護差的國家，公司仍會藉由發放股利來減輕代理問題。We use a sample of companies from 32 countries around the world to shed light on the relationship between dividend payouts and insider holdings. Schooley and Barney (1994) indicate that negative relationship between dividend payouts and ownership exists before a turning point; once managerial ownership exceeds the turning point, it switches to a positive one. Also, as La Porta et al. (2000) point out, legal protection causes that widely-held firms dominate in a protected environment and closely-held firms in an unprotected one. So, most research addresses a negative relationship between dividend payouts and ownership. It is because their samples are usually composed of firms in a protected environment, where widely-held firms are the normality. By contrast, in countries with poor shareholder protection, closely-held companies prevail, and most of their ownership is coupled with control. Dividends thus become a tool for controlling shareholders to signal the moderation of expropriation and to reduce agency costs. Because firms with more concentrated ownership have less cost to pay dividends and need to allay the concerns about expropriation, it implies that more dividends are paid as the insider holdings increase. We surmise a positive relationship between ownership and payouts can be observed in an unprotected environment. The empirical evidence supports our hypothesis