The paper quantifies the amount of information aggregated by large elections under qualified majority rules. It shows show that, even when the Condorcet Jury Theorem does not hold, there still can be meaningful information aggregation. In particular, we study the case of information aggregation under rational ignorance and with poorly informed voters
This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with contin...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common val...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common val...
The paper quantifies the amount of information aggregated by large elections under qualified majorit...
The paper quantifies the amount of information aggregated by large elections under qualified majorit...
The paper quantifies the amount of information aggregated by large elections under qualified majorit...
Although majority rule has limited value for aggregating conflicting preferences, it offers promise ...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem and subsequent literature establish the feasibility of information aggreg...
In the seminal paper on voting games with private information, Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) derived...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation are frequently invoked to ensure the compet...
We investigate whether the plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in large elections with...
We study information aggregation in an election where agents can strategically choose when to vote, ...
We analyze two-candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state va...
We study aggregation of information when voters can collect information of different precision, with...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation are frequently invoked to ensure the compet...
This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with contin...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common val...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common val...
The paper quantifies the amount of information aggregated by large elections under qualified majorit...
The paper quantifies the amount of information aggregated by large elections under qualified majorit...
The paper quantifies the amount of information aggregated by large elections under qualified majorit...
Although majority rule has limited value for aggregating conflicting preferences, it offers promise ...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem and subsequent literature establish the feasibility of information aggreg...
In the seminal paper on voting games with private information, Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) derived...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation are frequently invoked to ensure the compet...
We investigate whether the plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in large elections with...
We study information aggregation in an election where agents can strategically choose when to vote, ...
We analyze two-candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state va...
We study aggregation of information when voters can collect information of different precision, with...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem or the Miracle of Aggregation are frequently invoked to ensure the compet...
This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with contin...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common val...
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common val...
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