We use public transfers in the form of food aid to test for the presence of risk sharing arrangements at the village level in rural Ethiopia. We reject perfect risk-sharing, but find evidence of partial risk-sharing via transfers. There is also evidence consistent with crowding out of informal insurance linked to food aid programmes
Risk Sharing and the Demand for Insurance: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Ethiopi
Transfers motivated by altruism, guilt, and norms of giving play an important role in supporting ind...
In many developing countries, the beneficiaries of transfer programmes are determined by community-b...
It is often assumed that transfers received from government, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), fri...
Households in developing countries use a variety of informal mechanisms to cope with risk, including...
It is often assumed that transfers received from governments, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), fr...
Most risk-sharing tests on developing country data are conducted at the level of the village; genera...
Most risk-sharing tests on developing country data are conducted at the level of the village; genera...
Most risk-sharing tests on developing country data are conducted at the level of the village; genera...
We investigate the effect of formal individual agricultural insurance on transfers by farmers in inf...
We examine the impact of formal insurance and informal risk-sharing institutions on welfare, and the...
Households in developing countries commonly engage in risk sharing to cope with shocks. Despite this...
Households in developing countries commonly engage in risk sharing to cope with shocks. Despite this...
Transfers motivated by altruism, guilt, and norms of giving play an important role in supporting ind...
Transfers motivated by altruism, guilt, and norms of giving play an important role in supporting ind...
Risk Sharing and the Demand for Insurance: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Ethiopi
Transfers motivated by altruism, guilt, and norms of giving play an important role in supporting ind...
In many developing countries, the beneficiaries of transfer programmes are determined by community-b...
It is often assumed that transfers received from government, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), fri...
Households in developing countries use a variety of informal mechanisms to cope with risk, including...
It is often assumed that transfers received from governments, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), fr...
Most risk-sharing tests on developing country data are conducted at the level of the village; genera...
Most risk-sharing tests on developing country data are conducted at the level of the village; genera...
Most risk-sharing tests on developing country data are conducted at the level of the village; genera...
We investigate the effect of formal individual agricultural insurance on transfers by farmers in inf...
We examine the impact of formal insurance and informal risk-sharing institutions on welfare, and the...
Households in developing countries commonly engage in risk sharing to cope with shocks. Despite this...
Households in developing countries commonly engage in risk sharing to cope with shocks. Despite this...
Transfers motivated by altruism, guilt, and norms of giving play an important role in supporting ind...
Transfers motivated by altruism, guilt, and norms of giving play an important role in supporting ind...
Risk Sharing and the Demand for Insurance: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Ethiopi
Transfers motivated by altruism, guilt, and norms of giving play an important role in supporting ind...
In many developing countries, the beneficiaries of transfer programmes are determined by community-b...