Consent, rights, and reasons for action

The normative power of consent plays a central role in enabling individuals to permissibly interact with one another. However, in the philosophical literature, the relationship between consent and permissible action is not always well understood. In this article I outline an account of the normative effect of valid consent, in order to clarify this relationship. I first argue that consent’s primary moral significance lies in its effect upon our interpersonal moral relationships. Specifically, I argue that valid consent serves to cancel a directed duty owed to the consenter. Other things being equal, this equips the consentee with a directed permission: they will no longer wrong the consenter by acting in the consented to manner. However, this account does not yet explain how consent impacts upon the all things considered permissibility of an action. On the assumption that all things considered permissibility is a function of an agent’s reasons for action, we require an account of consent’s effect on those reasons. I consider, and then reject, Michelle Dempsey’s recent suggestion that consent affects a consentee’s reasons for action by granting them an exclusionary permission. I propose that we should instead understand consent to function as a cancelling permission