In the bilateral assignment problem, source a holds the amount ra of resource of type a, while sink i must receive the total amount xi of the various resources. We look for assignment rules meeting the powerful separability property known as Consistency: “every subassignment of a fair assignment is fair”. They are essentially those rules selecting the feasible flow minimizing the sum ∑i,aW(yia), where W is smooth and strictly convex
How should we allocate a social endowment of objects among a group of agents when monetary compensat...
We study the distributive and consistency properties of the Uniform Alloca-tion Rule for solving the...
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of having stable rules for twosided markets with trans...
One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, a...
One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, a...
We consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than ...
Cataloged from PDF version of article.In a moneyless market, a nondisposable homogeneous commodity i...
One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, a...
<p>In a moneyless market, a nondisposable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents ...
In this paper we address a particular generalisation of the Assignment Problem (AP) in a Multi-Agent...
[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectori...
We interpret solution rules to a class of simple allocation problems as data on the choices of a pol...
In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity ...
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it...
When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assign...
How should we allocate a social endowment of objects among a group of agents when monetary compensat...
We study the distributive and consistency properties of the Uniform Alloca-tion Rule for solving the...
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of having stable rules for twosided markets with trans...
One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, a...
One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, a...
We consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than ...
Cataloged from PDF version of article.In a moneyless market, a nondisposable homogeneous commodity i...
One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, a...
<p>In a moneyless market, a nondisposable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents ...
In this paper we address a particular generalisation of the Assignment Problem (AP) in a Multi-Agent...
[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectori...
We interpret solution rules to a class of simple allocation problems as data on the choices of a pol...
In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity ...
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individually rational assignments. We show that it...
When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assign...
How should we allocate a social endowment of objects among a group of agents when monetary compensat...
We study the distributive and consistency properties of the Uniform Alloca-tion Rule for solving the...
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of having stable rules for twosided markets with trans...