ANALISIS INFORMASI ASIMETRIS KREDIT PADA MASYARAKAT PEDESAAN DI DAERAH ISTIMEWA YOGYAKARTA

Credit market is an imperfect market due to the existence of asymmetrical information between lenders and borrowers. Asymmetrical information in rural credit market caused credit rationing. The objectives of this research are to analyze unsymmetrical information of lenders, analyze the relation of asymmetrical information to transactional cost, warrant, and interest rate in both formal financial institution/bank and informal ones, indentify determining factors of credit rationing, moral hazard, and elections of credit sources. In this research, descriptive analytical method is used alongside sampling cluster method to acquire sample in villages in Kabupaten Sleman and Gunungkidul DIY. Sample data were taken in four chosen villages. Data are analyzed with variant analysis method (ANOVA) with LSD post hoc test and multinomial logit analysis. The existence of asymmetrical information in rural credit is shown by lender�s minimal control of information to individual character and businesses of rural society. The existence of asymmetrical information in rural credit caused distinctive differences in actualized transactional cost in geographical range, service�s speed, amount of credit taken, administration cost, and interest rate. Informal credit has closer geographical range and faster service. While larger formal credit came with higher administration cost. Interest rate in informal credit is higher. All formal credit�s acquirement requests warrant in form of land certificate, either BPKB or employee�s SK. Majority of formal credit�s acquirement contains moral hazard due to dissonance of credit usage. The determining factor which encourages moral hazard�s probabilities is the amount of credit. Monitoring function could distinctively reduce moral hazard ex ante�s probabilities. The majority of rural society is considered as non price rationing category. Further geographical range constitutes higher probabilities of credit�s access limitation. Immense land selection, owned asset, and household income could reduce probabilities of formal credit�s access limitation. Probabilities of selecting formal credit is higher with immense land properties, higher value of warrant, longer credit term, and lower bank interest rate. Asymmetric information that had by the bank need to be symmetrical with increasing the knowledge and the insight of a bank employee about the rural economy, especially agriculture. For cooperatives need to maximize the role as a bridge between formal credit to rural communities. For the group of informal credit providers that have symmetric information need the development of funds to fulfill the credit needs of rural communities