The Influence of Changes in Taiwan’s Legislative Electoral System on the Democratic Progressive Party (2008-2012)

Elections to the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan are crucial to the exercise of national legislative power, and an important mechanism for popular participation in decision making through representative politics. This study looks at the historical consequences of the political demands for a “single member, dual ballot” electoral system and “halving of legislative seats” during Taiwan’s democratization process, and the resultant path dependence for Taiwan’s legislative elections, from which the mixed-member system with two ballots in single member constituencies emerged as the direction for constitutional reform. This constitutional amendment project driven by cooperation between the two major parties in Taiwan ultimately produced a disproportional outcome, under which the Kuomintang (KMT) as the largest party has enjoyed a dominant position due to over-representation, while the number of seats won by other parties was reduced. This may not have been the result originally anticipated by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). However, changes in the electoral system occur in the context of path dependent dilemmas. Only a new wave of constitutional revisions can correct the large difference between legislative representation and the structure of the electorate, and bring the system closer to the basic principles of representative politics under democracy