Analysis of bargaining game using evolutionary computation is essential issue in the field of game theory. This paper investigates the interaction and coevolutionary process among heterogeneous artificial agents using evolutionary computation (EC) in the bargaining game. In particular, the game performance with regard to payoff through the interaction and coevolution of agents is studied. We present three kinds of EC based agents (EC-agent) participating in the bargaining game: genetic algorithm (GA), particle swarm optimization (PSO), and differential evolution (DE). The agents’ performance with regard to changing condition is compared. From the simulation results it is found that the PSO-agent is superior to the other agents
The creation of mathematical, as well as qualitative (or rule-based), models is difficult, time-cons...
The simple Nash demand game is analysed in an evolutionary context. The evolutionarily stable strate...
We describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents aregenerated by an evolut...
This paper explores the possibility of using evolutionary algorithms (EAs) to automatically generate...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
This paper studies the dynamic and equilibrium-selecting behavior of a multi-agent system consisting...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
Game-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect ...
This chapter seeks to follow Axelrod's research of computer simulations on the Iterated Prisoner's D...
Artificial agents, coevolving under a machine learning regime, offer a promising basis for modeling ...
Abstract — Bargaining is a fundamental activity in social life. Game-theoretic methodology has provi...
Abstract. We describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents are generated b...
Abstract. This paper compares two methodologies that have been used to understand the evolution of b...
We describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents aregenerated by an evolut...
textabstractReal-life negotiations typically involve multiple parties with different preferences for...
The creation of mathematical, as well as qualitative (or rule-based), models is difficult, time-cons...
The simple Nash demand game is analysed in an evolutionary context. The evolutionarily stable strate...
We describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents aregenerated by an evolut...
This paper explores the possibility of using evolutionary algorithms (EAs) to automatically generate...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
This paper studies the dynamic and equilibrium-selecting behavior of a multi-agent system consisting...
A systematic validation of evolutionary techniques in the field of bargaining is presented. For this...
Game-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect ...
This chapter seeks to follow Axelrod's research of computer simulations on the Iterated Prisoner's D...
Artificial agents, coevolving under a machine learning regime, offer a promising basis for modeling ...
Abstract — Bargaining is a fundamental activity in social life. Game-theoretic methodology has provi...
Abstract. We describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents are generated b...
Abstract. This paper compares two methodologies that have been used to understand the evolution of b...
We describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents aregenerated by an evolut...
textabstractReal-life negotiations typically involve multiple parties with different preferences for...
The creation of mathematical, as well as qualitative (or rule-based), models is difficult, time-cons...
The simple Nash demand game is analysed in an evolutionary context. The evolutionarily stable strate...
We describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents aregenerated by an evolut...