In this paper we study an oligopolistic equilibria in which (possibly few) corporations can crea te as many firms as they like. It is shown by means of two examples that under constant returns to scale, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria implies perfect competition.Publicad
In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of fi...
We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with p...
This paper considers a Cournot duopoly game with endogenous organization structures. There are two f...
In this paper we study an oligopolistic equilibria in which (possibly few) corporations can crea te ...
In this paper we study an oligopolistic equilibria in which (possibly few) corporations can create a...
In this paper, we assume that firms can create independent divisions which compete in quantities in ...
This paper deals with the optimal behaviour of a single public firm in an oligopolistic market where...
I present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly. Instead of assuming a homogeneous po...
We examine the formation of groups in a simple oligopoly with a linear demand function. Firms simult...
We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with pr...
We study the relation between the number of firms and market power in experimental oligopolies. Pric...
The paper uses the most general version of a Dixit–Stiglitz economy and the concept of oligopolistic...
We propose a comprehensive concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parametrized continu...
A rapidly growing literature analyzes models in which firms maximize objectives other than profit an...
In applying the common agency framework to the context of an oligopolistic industry, we want to go b...
In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of fi...
We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with p...
This paper considers a Cournot duopoly game with endogenous organization structures. There are two f...
In this paper we study an oligopolistic equilibria in which (possibly few) corporations can crea te ...
In this paper we study an oligopolistic equilibria in which (possibly few) corporations can create a...
In this paper, we assume that firms can create independent divisions which compete in quantities in ...
This paper deals with the optimal behaviour of a single public firm in an oligopolistic market where...
I present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly. Instead of assuming a homogeneous po...
We examine the formation of groups in a simple oligopoly with a linear demand function. Firms simult...
We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with pr...
We study the relation between the number of firms and market power in experimental oligopolies. Pric...
The paper uses the most general version of a Dixit–Stiglitz economy and the concept of oligopolistic...
We propose a comprehensive concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parametrized continu...
A rapidly growing literature analyzes models in which firms maximize objectives other than profit an...
In applying the common agency framework to the context of an oligopolistic industry, we want to go b...
In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of fi...
We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with p...
This paper considers a Cournot duopoly game with endogenous organization structures. There are two f...
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