A group of countries that can potentially commit to cooperation to protect the environment are identified as environmentally-conscious countries. Conditions are examined under which they can provide self-financing side payments, to a second group of less environmentally-conscious countries, so that the two groups form a global or partial stable coalition that agrees to emit at the first-best global welfare optimum. A mechanism is also developed which must be incorporated into the agreement between the two groups, in order to induce all countries to emit at the desired level, even when global pollution has nonpoint source pollution characteristics
Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IE...
This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environme...
This paper analyzes the problem of international environmental cooperation as a coalition formation...
A group of countries that can potentially commit to cooperation to protect the environment are ident...
In the face of transboundary pollution externalities, cooperation in regulatory efforts between coun...
This paper is devoted to study the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a p...
This paper provides a general framework for studying the profitability and stability of internationa...
This dissertation considers the theoretical aspects of countries' incentives to cooperate on environ...
We examine in this paper the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements w...
This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literatu...
International environmental cooperation is gaining more and more importance in a world with global c...
International environmental agreements offer a potent method for addressing environmental issues tha...
We examine in this paper the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements w...
Abstract Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agre...
The paper investigates the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in a pollution...
Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IE...
This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environme...
This paper analyzes the problem of international environmental cooperation as a coalition formation...
A group of countries that can potentially commit to cooperation to protect the environment are ident...
In the face of transboundary pollution externalities, cooperation in regulatory efforts between coun...
This paper is devoted to study the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a p...
This paper provides a general framework for studying the profitability and stability of internationa...
This dissertation considers the theoretical aspects of countries' incentives to cooperate on environ...
We examine in this paper the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements w...
This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literatu...
International environmental cooperation is gaining more and more importance in a world with global c...
International environmental agreements offer a potent method for addressing environmental issues tha...
We examine in this paper the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements w...
Abstract Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agre...
The paper investigates the stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in a pollution...
Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IE...
This paper analyses profitability and stability of international agreements to protect the environme...
This paper analyzes the problem of international environmental cooperation as a coalition formation...