Do strike variables wage increase settlements in Spain?

This paper analyzes the wage increases in a bargaining context using an unbalanced panel from the Spanish Collective Bargaining in Large Firms. Central to the analysis are the joint determination of strike and wage outcomes and the role of strike threats that are not always realized. We find a positive relationship between strike threats and the size of the settlement. We also find that a key characteristic of settlements conditional on strikes taking place is a negative relationship between the length of the strike and the size of the wage increase. Weı also find that wage increases respond positively to the level and the uncertainty of profits. Finally, we do not reject the possibility of wage determination processes being different for the strike and non-strike samples. These findings suggests that the behavior of employers isı either to early "concede" when observing a credible threat or to "resist" a realized conflictoı The crucial determinant of the decision is the expected profitability level