In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization of the welfare egalitarian correspondence in terms of three axioms: Pareto optimality, symmetry, and solidarity. This last property requires that an increase in the willingness to pay for the public goods of some of the agents should not decrease the welfare of any of them.Publicad
A binary choice problem with side-payments and quasi-linear utilities is considered. We study two co...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
A binary choice problem with side-payments and quasi-linear utilities is considered. We study two co...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic p...
We characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible...
We review the theory of fairness as it pertains to concretely specified problems of resource allocat...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
In economies with public goods, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence o...
This dissertation studies strategic social influence in the presence of a self-control problem and e...
In a non-welfaristic framework, Sen (1993) extends the first fundamental welfare theorem by demonstr...
In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence o...
We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A s...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
A binary choice problem with side-payments and quasi-linear utilities is considered. We study two co...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
A binary choice problem with side-payments and quasi-linear utilities is considered. We study two co...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic p...
We characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible...
We review the theory of fairness as it pertains to concretely specified problems of resource allocat...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
In economies with public goods, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence o...
This dissertation studies strategic social influence in the presence of a self-control problem and e...
In a non-welfaristic framework, Sen (1993) extends the first fundamental welfare theorem by demonstr...
In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence o...
We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A s...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
A binary choice problem with side-payments and quasi-linear utilities is considered. We study two co...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
A binary choice problem with side-payments and quasi-linear utilities is considered. We study two co...