Add to ORKGWe study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable (the fixed cost or a parameter in the payoff funtions) on the strategies played in a Symmetric Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry (SCEFE). We also show that any observation on prices, profits and number of firms is compatible with the assumption that the market under consideration is in a SCEFE. Therefore, in this model, there is no direct link between profitability and the number of active firms
Using an example, we study the analogs, for the differentiated product case, of the Cournot and Bert...
In the present paper, we propose an extension of Spengler's (1950) analysis of successive oligopolie...
Free entry equilibria are usually determined by resorting to the zero proÞt condition. We plead inst...
We study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable (the fixed cost or a parameter in the pa...
In this paper we study the effects of a change in an exogenous variable (the fixed cost or a paramet...
In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions...
This chapter deals with the theories of market equilibria when the number and characteristics of act...
Free entry equilibria are usually characterized by the zero profit condition. We plead instead for a...
In this note we consider Cournot oligopoly. Due to the consideration of several consumers and/ or te...
In this paper we study the effects of a change in sorne exogenous variable (the number of players o...
We provide a unified approach to imperfect (monopolistic, Bertrand and Cournot) competition when pre...
We prove the existence of symmetric pure Cournot equilibria with heterogeneous goods under the follo...
The paper analyzes the perfect equilibria of a two-stage entry/production game in a simple model wit...
Strategic market games model strategic exchange economies as noncoop- erative simultaneous moves ga...
We examine the relationship between the equilibrium number of the firms entering the market and soci...
Using an example, we study the analogs, for the differentiated product case, of the Cournot and Bert...
In the present paper, we propose an extension of Spengler's (1950) analysis of successive oligopolie...
Free entry equilibria are usually determined by resorting to the zero proÞt condition. We plead inst...
We study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable (the fixed cost or a parameter in the pa...
In this paper we study the effects of a change in an exogenous variable (the fixed cost or a paramet...
In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions...
This chapter deals with the theories of market equilibria when the number and characteristics of act...
Free entry equilibria are usually characterized by the zero profit condition. We plead instead for a...
In this note we consider Cournot oligopoly. Due to the consideration of several consumers and/ or te...
In this paper we study the effects of a change in sorne exogenous variable (the number of players o...
We provide a unified approach to imperfect (monopolistic, Bertrand and Cournot) competition when pre...
We prove the existence of symmetric pure Cournot equilibria with heterogeneous goods under the follo...
The paper analyzes the perfect equilibria of a two-stage entry/production game in a simple model wit...
Strategic market games model strategic exchange economies as noncoop- erative simultaneous moves ga...
We examine the relationship between the equilibrium number of the firms entering the market and soci...
Using an example, we study the analogs, for the differentiated product case, of the Cournot and Bert...
In the present paper, we propose an extension of Spengler's (1950) analysis of successive oligopolie...
Free entry equilibria are usually determined by resorting to the zero proÞt condition. We plead inst...