This article studies the replicator dynamics in the presence of shocks. I show that under these dynamics, strategics that do not survive the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies are eliminated in the long run, even in the presence of nonvanishing perturbations. I also give an example that shows that the stochastic dynamics in this article have equilibrium selection properties that differ from other dynamics in the literature.Publicad
We extend the notion of evolutionarily stable strategies introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (1973...
O.1. Imitative protocols, mean dynamics, and equilibrium selection In this section, we consider stoc...
We study the behavior of a stochastic variant of replicator dynamics in two-agent zero-sum games. We...
This article studies the replicator dynamics in the presence of shocks. I show that under these dyna...
We investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populations of myopic players t...
International audienceWe investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populatio...
International audienceWe consider a novel model of stochastic replicator dynamics for potential game...
International audienceWe study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in or...
International audienceIt is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in corr...
Kuzmics C. On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large p...
Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics for finite populations has recently been widely explored in th...
We present a family of games for which, under the replicator dynamics and from an open set of initia...
In this thesis we establish a theory of evolutionary dynamics that accounts for the following requir...
It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may...
This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics...
We extend the notion of evolutionarily stable strategies introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (1973...
O.1. Imitative protocols, mean dynamics, and equilibrium selection In this section, we consider stoc...
We study the behavior of a stochastic variant of replicator dynamics in two-agent zero-sum games. We...
This article studies the replicator dynamics in the presence of shocks. I show that under these dyna...
We investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populations of myopic players t...
International audienceWe investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of large populatio...
International audienceWe consider a novel model of stochastic replicator dynamics for potential game...
International audienceWe study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in or...
International audienceIt is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in corr...
Kuzmics C. On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large p...
Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics for finite populations has recently been widely explored in th...
We present a family of games for which, under the replicator dynamics and from an open set of initia...
In this thesis we establish a theory of evolutionary dynamics that accounts for the following requir...
It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may...
This paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics...
We extend the notion of evolutionarily stable strategies introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (1973...
O.1. Imitative protocols, mean dynamics, and equilibrium selection In this section, we consider stoc...
We study the behavior of a stochastic variant of replicator dynamics in two-agent zero-sum games. We...