A New Framework for Social Collective Epistemology

Epistemic Autonomy is the idea deeply imbedded in the mainstream epistemological tradition that in order to possess knowledge one must possess all the knowledge-requisite goods (KRGs) generating it (e.g. evidence, cognitive abilities). But an increasing number of philosophers claim that a good deal of what we all want to call “knowledge” is knowledge via extended justification (EJK), that is, knowledge for which no individual can possess all KRGs. The most vivid apparent cases are in ‘big science’. For example, some high-energy particle physics collaborations consist of thousands of active researchers (e.g. physicists, engineers, technicians, data analysts, etc.) of various sorts who are spread across the globe. The same can be said of bodies like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). When vast numbers of individuals with diverse expertise produce knowledge-level evidence that, say, Higgs particles exist, who can possess this knowledge? If epistemic autonomy is necessary for possessing knowledge, then individuals cannot possess EJK. It can be possessed only by the groups across which justificatory labour extends (e.g. experimental collaborations, research teams).Ph.D