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The region of Tacna in the south of Peru is characterized by an exceptionally dry climate. At the head of the Atacama desert, the region's very small water supply is further stressed by extractions by industry, mining, and a large metropolitan population. In the face of these significant supply issues, there has been little action by the authorities in Tacna for water conservation. This paper examines water conservation as a public good under the theoretical framework of Mancur Olson's 1971 theory of public goods and collective action. In Tacna, as groups of rational, self-interested individuals, the various players do very little to conserve water, hindered by the high cost-benefit ratio of conservation. Instead, there exists a culture of blame in Tacna, with each player accusing the others of exacerbating water supply issues. In order for conservation to occur in Tacna, it is necessary that all of the region's players collaborate. This paper makes recommendations for the future of water management in Tacna including the restructuring of education programs, creation of incentive programs for water conservation, and improvements to infrastructure. It identifies the agricultural sector as an investment focus and advocates for the creation of water working groups for the representative negotiation of collaborative action by the major players in the region