Morality of personal punishment: Deterrence and revenge

It is a fact of daily life that individuals punish other individuals for harms or offences that are not against the law, by means that are also not against the law. But the moral legitimacy of this practice is rarely questioned. Moral critiques of punishment are typically directed at institutional punishment, not personal punishment. This dissertation takes initial steps toward answering the question of whether personal punishment is morally permitted. In it, I examine two kinds of personal punishments. The purpose of one is to deter, and the other, to obtain some kind of payment, a “payback”. I ask whether either of those purposes is also a sufficient moral reason for punishing. I conclude that neither is, with qualifications, leaving other plausible justifications of personal punishment, such as reciprocity, education, and communication, for future research. I argue that while deterrence can remain a purpose without being a sufficient moral reason for personal punishment, it is doubtful whether receiving payment can even be a purpose, since personal punishment as “payback” is unable to fulfill it. To demonstrate the latter, I begin by explaining first that receiving certain kinds of payments cannot constitute punishments, and second that payment received in virtue of the other’s suffering is most likely to be an emotional satisfaction of some sort. After examining the roles of relevant psychological states, for or against the permissibility of personal punishment, I single out resentment, particularly because of its association with self-esteem and sense of honour, as the most relevant state. I then argue that the proper satisfaction of resentment requires payment of a remorseful apology. Therefore the suffering of the other that satisfies resentment is distinct from the suffering caused by punishment. I argue that satisfying resentment, fully or partially, is a moral reason for some actions that would constitute alternatives to personal punishment, but not for personal punishment itself. Moreover, if punishment cannot satisfy resentment, the payment of resentment-satisfaction cannot even be a purpose for personal punishment.Ph