Japanese-German relations and the impact of the war in Europe on Japan's strategy of southern advance, 1935-1941

grantor: University of TorontoFor the Japanese, the outbreak of war in Europe seemed to be a "godsend." It wasn't, however, the windfall which they had expected it to be. If Japan had properly seized the moment, they could have turned the events in Europe to their advantage; but they didn't, and what was thought to be a "godsend" turned out to be more of an "evil demon." Unfortunate as it was for Japan, the Japanese people had become intoxicated with the German victories, turning their heads to gaze towards the south--it was all quite pitiful; the divine wind turned out to be an ill wind.1 So goes Satô Kenryô's appraisal of Japan's fortunes in the Pacific War. This summary is germane to the present thesis insofar as it alludes to the fact that Japan's fortunes were strongly tied to events in Europe. During the two-year period immediately preceding the outbreak of war in the Pacific islands and Southeast Asia (On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland, and Great Britain and France declared war upon Germany two days later), the ' Blitzkrieg' attacks of the 'Wehrmacht' had resulted in overwhelmingly successful German military campaigns throughout much of Europe. In the Pacific, however, apart from their interminable conflict with China, Japan was not yet engaged in open warfare; even the "China Incident" remained an undeclared war. Japan preferred at this stage to make inroads and establish her footholds by other means: diplomacy, intimidation, cajolery; anything short of open hostilities. Herein we may discern the essence of Japanese strategy and the main subject of this thesis. I shall make the argument that Japanese strategy was intimately linked to events in Europe--being essentially predicated upon German successes; that is, Japan took advantage of Germany's successful military campaigns in Europe to advance her own agenda in the Far East. By allying themselves with Germany through the Anti-Comintern, and later, Tripartite Pact, the Japanese hoped to deflect the attention of America and the European democracies away from their activities in the Far East as they executed their southern advance. 1Satô Kenryô, 'Daitôa sensô kaikoroku' (Tokyo: Tokuma shoten, 1966), p. 91. Satô Kenryô was appointed chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau in February 1941. He also served as the Vice-Chief of Staff of the South China Army.Ph.D