Peirce, Santayana, and the presuppositions of belief

grantor: University of TorontoThis thesis is a critical and comparative analysis of the philosophies of Charles Sanders Peirce and George Santayana. The general focus is on their analyses of belief and knowledge. The first chapter explores Peirce's and Santayana's negative reactions against methodological scepticism. The second chapter presents their arguments against foundationalism. With the rejection of scepticism and foundationalism, the question remains of how knowledge is possible. In the third chapter it is argued that Santayana is correct that every belief, and by implication every claim to knowledge, begins with the presupposition of substance, and that this presupposition cannot be rationally justified but must be assumed in animal faith. It is argued that neither Peirce nor the other empiricists have good reasons to reject Santayana's claim. The fourth and final chapter examines Santayana's position that the type of substance actually presupposed in thought and practice is matter. Santayana's doctrine of matter is outlined, as is his accounts of truth and essence, and it is shown what defence Santayana can offer for his doctrine of matter. Santayana's position is then compared and evaluated within a Peircean perspective. The conclusion arrived at is that while both Peirce and Santayana recognise the existence of a mind-independent reality, the way they envision this reality is very different. While Santayana offers a compelling form of materialism, Peirce's pragmatism, combined with his doctrine of Secondness, leads him to idealism.Ph.D