Add to ORKGAbstractIf an altruist is expected to aid a person with low utility, that person may beinduced to save little. Such behavior generates a good Samaritan dilemma, in whichwelfare is lower than when no one is altruistic. Governmental transfers, which restrictreallocation from a person who saves much to one who saves little, reduce the effectand can lead to an outcome which is Pareto-superior to the outcome under a Nashequilibrium with no government taxation and transfers.25 Halama
We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from a direct solicita...
Purpose: This paper provides some preliminary results on the role of altruism on wellbeing through s...
This paper presents a model in which anonymous charitable donations are ratio-nalized by two human t...
An altruistic agent who may aid a person with a low income may cause that person to exert little eff...
Should an aid donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its budget to an agent less averse t...
This paper presents a model of private provision of a public good where individuals in a group have ...
Abstract: We examine altruistically motivated consumption transfers in an effort to account for nonm...
Previous theory has suggested that altruism in other people's utility does not affect the optimal le...
This paper examines whether altruism causes the transfer paradox in the model with two countries and...
We focus on an “equilibrium analysis ” of coordination problems in giving that lead to multiple equi...
This paper extends a standard altruism model of private transfers to a multiple goods model. It has ...
The debate about the merits of the redistributive state generally focuses on the proper trade-offbet...
In recent years there has been rapidly growing interest in the implications of altruistic preference...
There is abundant evidence that inter-vivos transfers are more important in low-income countries tha...
This article demonstrates that Ricardian equivalence does not necessarily hold in models with altrui...
We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from a direct solicita...
Purpose: This paper provides some preliminary results on the role of altruism on wellbeing through s...
This paper presents a model in which anonymous charitable donations are ratio-nalized by two human t...
An altruistic agent who may aid a person with a low income may cause that person to exert little eff...
Should an aid donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its budget to an agent less averse t...
This paper presents a model of private provision of a public good where individuals in a group have ...
Abstract: We examine altruistically motivated consumption transfers in an effort to account for nonm...
Previous theory has suggested that altruism in other people's utility does not affect the optimal le...
This paper examines whether altruism causes the transfer paradox in the model with two countries and...
We focus on an “equilibrium analysis ” of coordination problems in giving that lead to multiple equi...
This paper extends a standard altruism model of private transfers to a multiple goods model. It has ...
The debate about the merits of the redistributive state generally focuses on the proper trade-offbet...
In recent years there has been rapidly growing interest in the implications of altruistic preference...
There is abundant evidence that inter-vivos transfers are more important in low-income countries tha...
This article demonstrates that Ricardian equivalence does not necessarily hold in models with altrui...
We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from a direct solicita...
Purpose: This paper provides some preliminary results on the role of altruism on wellbeing through s...
This paper presents a model in which anonymous charitable donations are ratio-nalized by two human t...