The original publication is available at www.rairo-ro.orgTwo games are inseparable by semivalues if both games obtain the same allocation whatever semivalue is considered. The problem of separability by semivalues reduces to separability from the null game. For four or more players, the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game by semivalues contains games different to zero-game. Now, for five or more players, the consideration of a priori coalition blocks in the player set allows us to reduce in a significant way the dimension of the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game. For these subspaces we provide basis formed by games of a particular type
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set N can form a coalition and e...
We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition forma-tion when an exogen...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multi-agent systems with externalities (i...
The original publication is available at www.rairo-ro.orgTwo games are inseparable by semivalues if ...
We say that two situations described by cooperative games are inseparable by a family of solutions, ...
The semivalues are solution concepts for cooperative games that assign to each player a weighted sum...
Semivalues are solution concepts for cooperative games that assign to each player a weighted sum of ...
Semivalues like the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value may assign the same payoff vector to differe...
Several relationships between simple games and a particular type of solu- tions for cooperative gam...
Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of solutions, each of wh...
Abstract: This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with general coalitiona...
We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of stable coalitional structures in a purely hedo...
We consider games of transferable utility, those that deal with partial cooperation situations, made...
The first chapter introduces the topic of coalition structures and stresses its importance and impac...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multi-agent systems with externalities (i...
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set N can form a coalition and e...
We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition forma-tion when an exogen...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multi-agent systems with externalities (i...
The original publication is available at www.rairo-ro.orgTwo games are inseparable by semivalues if ...
We say that two situations described by cooperative games are inseparable by a family of solutions, ...
The semivalues are solution concepts for cooperative games that assign to each player a weighted sum...
Semivalues are solution concepts for cooperative games that assign to each player a weighted sum of ...
Semivalues like the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value may assign the same payoff vector to differe...
Several relationships between simple games and a particular type of solu- tions for cooperative gam...
Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of solutions, each of wh...
Abstract: This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with general coalitiona...
We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of stable coalitional structures in a purely hedo...
We consider games of transferable utility, those that deal with partial cooperation situations, made...
The first chapter introduces the topic of coalition structures and stresses its importance and impac...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multi-agent systems with externalities (i...
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set N can form a coalition and e...
We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition forma-tion when an exogen...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multi-agent systems with externalities (i...