Add to ORKGWe address the problem of extending the Shapley-Shubik index to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017). On the one hand, we provide bounds for any efficient, symmetric, and monotonic power index. On the other hand, we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano (2008) to the class of games under study by adapting well-known properties
Game theory provides valuable tools to examine expert multi-agent systems. In a cooperative game, co...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalit...
In this note we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano...
We address the problem of extending the Shapley-Shubik index to the class of simple games with exter...
In this study, we introduce and examine the Egalitarian property for some power indices on the class...
International audienceThis work focuses on multi-type games in which there are a number of non-order...
Electronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 19...
In the paper we introduce weighted and restricted versions of the Deegan-Packel power index. We show...
We study the complexity of computing the Shapley value in games with externalities. We focus on two ...
We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main ...
Some properties of the Shapley-Shubik index are presented in this chapter, along with indications as...
In the class of complete games, the Shapley index of power is the characteristic invariant of the gr...
This chapter reviews some results from the literature in which power indices related to the Shapley ...
We generalize the notion of power index for simple games to different orders of criticality, where t...
Game theory provides valuable tools to examine expert multi-agent systems. In a cooperative game, co...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalit...
In this note we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano...
We address the problem of extending the Shapley-Shubik index to the class of simple games with exter...
In this study, we introduce and examine the Egalitarian property for some power indices on the class...
International audienceThis work focuses on multi-type games in which there are a number of non-order...
Electronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 19...
In the paper we introduce weighted and restricted versions of the Deegan-Packel power index. We show...
We study the complexity of computing the Shapley value in games with externalities. We focus on two ...
We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main ...
Some properties of the Shapley-Shubik index are presented in this chapter, along with indications as...
In the class of complete games, the Shapley index of power is the characteristic invariant of the gr...
This chapter reviews some results from the literature in which power indices related to the Shapley ...
We generalize the notion of power index for simple games to different orders of criticality, where t...
Game theory provides valuable tools to examine expert multi-agent systems. In a cooperative game, co...
For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the conc...
In this paper, we provide further support for the family of average values for games with externalit...