Add to ORKGIt is widely accepted in the literature about the classicalCournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stableunique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolistsas industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instabilityis proved false
We investigate the stability of collusion in a market where firms cannot prevent entry. In a symmetr...
This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the cl...
We analyse the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly with heterogeneous players to investigate the effects o...
It is widely accepted in the literature about the classical Cournot oligopoly model that the loss o...
In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions...
We consider a model of evolutionary competition between adjustment processes in the Cournot oligopol...
This paper considers a model of endogenous bilateral cross-holdings. A notion of pairwise stability ...
AbstractThis paper reconsiders the relation between oligopoly and perfect competition, more specific...
Abstract: A stable market structure is a partition of the firms in an industry such that there is n...
In this paper, we show that an oligopoly market where both increasing returns to scale and competiti...
We investigate the (dynamic) stability of a Stackelberg oligopoly model of a market of a homogeneous...
In a Cournot model for a single homogeneous good, we study simultaneously two stability properties o...
We study the stability of cartels in a dynamic oligopoly. We use the differential game model of an o...
There are, essentially, two basic models for studying oligopolistic competition: the Cournot model, ...
This paper presents an explanation of imperfect adjustment of prices to current market conditions, b...
We investigate the stability of collusion in a market where firms cannot prevent entry. In a symmetr...
This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the cl...
We analyse the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly with heterogeneous players to investigate the effects o...
It is widely accepted in the literature about the classical Cournot oligopoly model that the loss o...
In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions...
We consider a model of evolutionary competition between adjustment processes in the Cournot oligopol...
This paper considers a model of endogenous bilateral cross-holdings. A notion of pairwise stability ...
AbstractThis paper reconsiders the relation between oligopoly and perfect competition, more specific...
Abstract: A stable market structure is a partition of the firms in an industry such that there is n...
In this paper, we show that an oligopoly market where both increasing returns to scale and competiti...
We investigate the (dynamic) stability of a Stackelberg oligopoly model of a market of a homogeneous...
In a Cournot model for a single homogeneous good, we study simultaneously two stability properties o...
We study the stability of cartels in a dynamic oligopoly. We use the differential game model of an o...
There are, essentially, two basic models for studying oligopolistic competition: the Cournot model, ...
This paper presents an explanation of imperfect adjustment of prices to current market conditions, b...
We investigate the stability of collusion in a market where firms cannot prevent entry. In a symmetr...
This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the cl...
We analyse the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly with heterogeneous players to investigate the effects o...