Add to ORKGOn the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate how the main results in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) vary when we replace self consistency by projected consistency or max consistency. As a consequence, we obtain several axiomatic comparison among the (weighted) Shapley value, the (weighted) surplus division solution and the prenucleolus
In the framework of cooperative game theory, Sobolev (Advances in game theory, Izdat., “Minitis”, Vi...
The family of weighted Shapley values for cooperative n-person transferable utility games is studied...
It was a quarter of a century ago that Sobolev proved the reduced game (otherwise called consistency...
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the ...
We define the potential of multi-choice cooperative games, find the relationship between the multi-c...
On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce path monotonicity, a prop...
In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomat...
This paper formally introduces Hart–Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solut...
In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable ...
Motivated by a case of discrimination against some particular players happened in the real world, we...
The main purpose of this survey paper is to review the axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley va...
On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate if there are single-val...
By Hart and Mas-Colell's axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully ch...
Abstract. The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game dis-tributes the dividend of ...
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalit...
In the framework of cooperative game theory, Sobolev (Advances in game theory, Izdat., “Minitis”, Vi...
The family of weighted Shapley values for cooperative n-person transferable utility games is studied...
It was a quarter of a century ago that Sobolev proved the reduced game (otherwise called consistency...
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the ...
We define the potential of multi-choice cooperative games, find the relationship between the multi-c...
On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce path monotonicity, a prop...
In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomat...
This paper formally introduces Hart–Mas-Colell consistency for general (possibly multi-valued) solut...
In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable ...
Motivated by a case of discrimination against some particular players happened in the real world, we...
The main purpose of this survey paper is to review the axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley va...
On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate if there are single-val...
By Hart and Mas-Colell's axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully ch...
Abstract. The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game dis-tributes the dividend of ...
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalit...
In the framework of cooperative game theory, Sobolev (Advances in game theory, Izdat., “Minitis”, Vi...
The family of weighted Shapley values for cooperative n-person transferable utility games is studied...
It was a quarter of a century ago that Sobolev proved the reduced game (otherwise called consistency...